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INTRODUCTION
Traditional Erie' is like a false front on a movie set, with few see-
ing the unfinished rear side. That other side represents the extent of
federal law applicable in state courts, which the legal system deter-
mines under a doctrine called reverse-Erie2 (or occasionally by aca-
demics "converse-Erie"3 or "inverse-Erie"4). While everyone has an Erie
theory and stands ready to debate it, almost no one has a theory of
reverse-Erie, and no one at all has developed a clear choice-of-law
methodology for it: reverse-Erie, often misunderstood, mischaracter-
ized, and misapplied by judges and commentators, goes strangely ig-
nored by most scholars.
5
1 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 The term seems to have first appeared in commentary and case law through
off-handed usages by William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 34 (1963), and American Universal Insurance Co. v. Chauvin, 329 F.2d 174, 179
(5th Cir. 1964) ("Nothing we here do or say is intended as even a gentle reverse-Erie
breeze to the contrary."); cf. infra note 104 (earlier similar usage).
3 E.g., RICHARD L. MARcus, MARTIN H. REDtSH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CML PRO-
CEDURE 1002 (4th ed. 2005).
4 E.g., Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49
U. PIr. L. REv. 937, 941 n.10, 963 n.76 (1988).
5 Remarkably little has been written on the doctrine (and, as one of my students
pointed out tactfully, Googling "reverse-Eie" reveals little of significance besides this
Article), The earliest article on the subject is the prescient one by Alfred Hill, Sub-
stance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem ? 17 OHIo ST.
L.J. 384 (1956). Professor Hill detected and generalized the emergent doctrine, link-
[VOL. 82:1
REVERSE-ERIE
Beyond eagerly theorizing about Erie, nearly everyone acknowl-
edges its central importance. 6 They see its classic judicial choice-of-
law7 progeny as essential to understanding the bigger issue of the law
applicable in federal court regardless of the governmental institution
that chose the law, which issue in turn leads to the most general prob-
ing and analogizing it to the Erie line of cases while noting significant differences that
argued for both a more intrusive and a less intrusive doctrine than Erie. Id. at 411-15.
But as to reverse-Erie methodology, he was hindered by the fact that he was writing in
the heyday of outcome-determinative analysis. The most recent article is the in-
sightful one by AnthonyJ. BelliaJr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law,
153 U. PA. L. REv. 825 (2005). Professor Belliajustified the authority of state courts to
"make" federal common law, as long as they do so in accordance with existing federal
law. Id. at 886-88. But his concern was with the constitutional authority of states to
make any federal law, rather than with the methodology for deciding when federal
law governs in state court. Id. at 901-09. Between those two articles came the follow-
ing useful works, which built in their understanding: Note, State Enforcement of Federally
Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1551, 1557-61 (1960) (arguing in favor of a nonintru-
sive reverse-Erie approach equivalent to the then prevailing Erie interest balancing);
Samuel S. Wilson, Note, Procedural Protection for Federal Rights in State Courts, 30 U. CIN.
L. REV. 184, 188-89 (1961) (distinguishing reverse-Erie, Erie, and horizontal conflicts
settings); Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 725, 747-48, 766-77 (1981) (re-equating reverse-Erie and Erie
problems); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70
TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1784-96 (1992) (linking reverse-Erie to preemption); Martin H.
Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the
Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REv. 71, 99-108 (1998) (arguing for a rigid
approach to reverse-Erie, with an intrusive role for federal law), critiqued by Vicki C.
Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REv. 111,
131, 136-40 (1998) (favoring an unspecified but less intrusive balancing approach).
6 "It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision." CHARLvs
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 55, at 378 (6th ed. 2002).
While that quotation must be an overstatement in itself, cf Kevin M. Clermont, Fore-
word to Kuo-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAw, at ix, xviii n.50
(2003) (discussing other kinds of self-contradictory statements), it is not far off from
representativeness or from accuracy.
7 The Erie situation involves a "choice of law" in the sense that the federal au-
thority is deciding whether federal law should be generated to apply to a given issue
or state law should be left to govern. The decision on this "vertical" choice of law is
often reached by a process similar to that employed in the more traditional "horizon-
tal" choice of law. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts
Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1235, 1255-63 (1999); Martin
H. Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westin and Lehman, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 959, 960-62 (1980). Indeed, some have found in traditional conflict-of-laws doc-
trine the answer both to reverse-Erie, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 5, at 1753-54 (argu-
ing that the Supremacy Clause calls for federal law to prevail in all cases of so-called
actual conflicts), and to preemption, e.g., Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional
Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. Pr-r. L. REv. 181, 230-31 (2004) (suggesting a more
nuanced use of comparative impairment analysis).
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lem of the appropriate relationship between state and federal law
throughout the legal system. For some judges and commentators,
"Erid' connotes only the courts' choice-of-law methodology," but for
others, and for this Article, the name connotes as well these broader
topics of state and federal laws' interplay. 9 That is, judicial choice of
law is just one corner of the whole, even if it is the corner that has
generated the greatest interest and provided the greatest explanatory
force. Its classic cases-difficult cases in diversity that primarily con-
cerned the law governing quasi-procedural issues on which the Consti-
tution and Congress were silent-are uniquely informing as to the
megadoctrine on the governing law in a system of federalism.10
Reverse-Erie occupies the opposite side of the federalism coin
from that occupied by the classic Erie cases. In state court, when does
state law apply and when does federal law apply? By this formulation,
reverse-Erie poses a question that is very similar to the Erie question-
although tantalizingly, it does not have an identical answer, as we shall
see. It also seems to pose a question at least as important as Erie-and
in fact numerically far more significant because, as everybody knows,
the volume of business in state courts dwarfs that in federal courts,
and federal law covers a wide array of litigation-producing activities
that end up in state court. Consequently, the denigrated or ignored
reverse-Erie doctrine appears to be, on its own, both a potentially in-
structive and an undeniably important feature of the fundamental re-
lationship of state and federal law.
This Article contends that reverse-Erie does indeed hold the key
to understanding the major problem ubiquitously encountered in our
system: the choice between state and federal law. This Article will
eventually build to the contention that every actor, public or private,
who faces a legal question in a federal system must first resolve this
question of vertical choice of law. Therefore, at the least, one cannot
fully understand the overall relationship of state and federal law if the
reverse-Erie piece of the puzzle is missing (to be mercilessly unfaithful
to metaphor). Arguably, one cannot truly understand even the Erie
side alone if one ignores the reverse-Erie doctrine.
This Article accordingly tries, in Part I, to unearth the reverse-Erie
doctrine by developing a theory and methodology. Then it will more
8 See, e.g., Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying
Erie choice-of-law analysis in a diversity action); Bauer, supra note 7, at 1236 (analogiz-
ing Erie to traditional choice of law).
9 See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 5, at 901-09.
10 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 7, at 1243-63 (describing the process by which
courts applying Erie identify and resolve conflicts between state and federal law).
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briefly try, in Part II, to explain the overlooked significance of this
subject.
I. DOCTRINE
By reverse-Erie, federal law flows down to govern in state court.
Under currently expressed views of the doctrine, however, it does so
by uncertain means and to an uncertain extent.12
To get more of a handle on reverse-Erie as a matter of judicial
choice of law, analysts most often start from preemption.13 They do so
because it is the most closely related doctrine in the task of determin-
ing the reach of federal law. t4 It is in some senses the more important
doctrine, with big consequences in both federal and state litigation as
well as out in the real world.
Preemption, in brief, is an ill-bounded constitutional doctrine
that invalidates state law if it interferes with federal law.' 5 Although
preemption tends to focus on displacement of state substantive law by
11 See, e.g., Mack v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 838 N.E.2d 80, 87 (I1. App. Ct.
2005), appeal denied, 850 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. 2006).
12 See, e.g., David W. Robertson, Admiralty and Maritime Litigation in State Court, 55
LA. L. REv. 685, 700 (1995) (noting the inconsistency in Supreme Court pronounce-
ments on the question of whether state courts must apply federal or state law in mari-
time cases).
13 E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.5 (4th ed. 2003); Wein-
berg, supra note 5, at 1785-86. But cf. infra note 207 (noting other doctrines that
federal courts scholars use as points of departure for approaching reverse-Erie).
14 Preemption in turn bumps up against the constitutional doctrines of "federal-
ism" that limit federal powers to certain spheres or that invoke the Tenth Amend-
ment to prohibit exercise of those federal powers in certain ways impinging on the
states' sovereignty. See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW Is 13-48 (2004). Com-
pare David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemp-
tionJurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (1999) ("For most
judges, whether liberal or conservative, these cases pit one dimension of their ideol-
ogy, their principles of federalism, against another, their policy preferences or atti-
tudes toward the particular local regulation at issue."), and Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEx. L. REX'. 1, 130-34 (2004) (arguing to resolve
the tension between preemption and federalism in favor of state autonomy by limit-
ing preemption), with Allison H. Eid, Preemption and the Federalism Five, 37 RuTGERS
L.J. 1, 26-28 (2005) (reconciling the tension between preemption and federalism
principles).
15 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2 (3d ed. 2006); CHRISTO-
PHER R. DRAIIoZAL, THE Supp.EmAcv CLAUSE 89-125 (Jack Stark ed., 2004). A similar
analysis applies in determining when a federal statute, such as a securities act, repeals
a prior federal statute, such as an antitrust act. See, e.g., Billing v. Credit Suisse First
Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2005); cf Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The
Powers That Be: A Reexamination of the Federal Courts' Rulemaking and Adjudicatory Powers
in the Context of a Clash of a Congressional Statute and a Supreme Court Rule, 57 BAYLOR L.
20061
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congressional statute, judges and commentators 
recognize that it can
displace state procedural law too,'
6 and that it can occur by federal
administrative act
1 7 or even by the effect of federal common 
law.',
Preemption can be express
19 or implied; and implied preemption can
trump a state provision that conflicts by discrimination 
against or con-
tradiction to federal law
20 or stands as an obstacle to federal law,
2 ' or
can authorize federal law to occupy exclusively 
a whole field,
22 al-
though of course all these categories 
are blurry.
23
REV. 587, 606-15 (2005) (assessing the federal 
courts' analysis of conflicts between
rules that incorporate state law and statutes).
16 See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 
456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982) (due process);
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State 
Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947,
959-62 (2001).
17 See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666-70 
(1962); DRAHOzAL, supra note 15, at 95.
18 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964); Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 
102-04 (1962); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note
6, § 45, at 294; Martha A. Field, Sources 
of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 
99
HARv. L. REV. 881, 897 (1986); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CiI. L. REv. 1, 6 (1985).
19 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 484 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518-24 (1992). 
Compare Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State
Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the 
Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1, 2-4, 88-90
(1995) (arguing that express statutory provisions 
are not wise and that courts should
play the more active role in preemption analysis), 
with Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. 
L. REv. 1321, 1427-29 (2001) (arguing that
preemption should follow only from a clearly 
preemptive statute).
20 See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (saying in
dicta that state law would be preempted if 
laws "impose directly conflicting duties on
national banks-as they would, for example, 
if the federal law said, 'you must sell
insurance,' while the state law said, 'you may not'"); 
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (saying 
that state law would be preempted
"where compliance with both federal and state regulations 
is a physical
impossibility").
21 See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (saying 
that state law would be preempted
where "the Federal Statute authorizes national 
banks to engage in activities that the
State Statute expressly forbids"); Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (saying
that state law would be preempted where 
it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress").
22 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy 
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983) (saying that state law 
would be preempted when "the Federal
Government completely occupies a given 
field or an identifiable portion of it"); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947) ("The scheme of federal regula-
tion may be so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it. Or 
the Act of Congress may touch a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant 
that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject." (citations omitted)).
23 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000).
[VOL. 82:1DAME L= IAW REVIEW
REVERSE-ERIE
In exploring preemption, as one gets into implied preemption by
conflict and turns toward possible preemption of state procedural law
otherwise applicable in state court, one encounters the classic reverse-
Erie cases, which books often treat as sui generis under some heading
like "State Court Procedures and Federal Law Claims." 24 As one
pushes further into judicial decisions that on their own federalize
some point of law for state courts, without any semblance of a search
for actual congressional intent, one starts to see the wider application
of reverse-Erie.2,5 Then, when one perceives complementary method-
ologies at work in these two realms of implied preemption and judi-
cial choice of law, one should start to sense the significance of reverse-
Erie.
Nevertheless, many commentators end up considering reverse-
Erie to amount to nothing more than preemption. 26 Their view has
wide consequences. Because preemption most often involves only dis-
placement of state substantive law by interpretation of congressional
legislation, these commentators tend to think predominantly in those
terms.27 Moreover, quotes abound in the case law about preemption
24 DRAiozAL, supra note 15, at 84.
25 See, e.g., Mack v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 838 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (applying federal maritime law), appeal denied, 850 N.E.2d 808 (I1. 2006).
26 E.g., Weinberg, supra note 5, at 1785-86; see, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13,
§ 3.5.
27 See, e.g., DRA-tozAL, supra note 15, at 90; Davis, supra note 7, at 198-200; Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000) [hereinafter Nelson, Preemption].
For an example of the flawed consequences of this approach, Professor Nelson cen-
trally argues that, under his view, federal law can implicitly preempt no more than
state law that logically contradicts the federal law, and not state law that merely frus-
trates the federal law, id. at 260-64; accordingly, he concludes that, in the absence of
an explicitly preemptive statute, the current doctrine of obstacle preemption byjudi-
cial construction lies beyond the proper reach of the Supremacy Clause and preemp-
tion. Id. at 265-90. His position, however, could make sense only in a legal system
with no judicial lawmaking. Imagine a point of law that obstacle preemption would
currently federalize but that he would leave to state law in state court. When that
point arises in a federal action, an Erie analysis would almost always lead to creation of
federal common law, because here the implied-preemption and federal-common-law
doctrines overlap and because the latter would encounter no limitation comparable
to his restriction on obstacle preemption. Once that federal common law definitely
exists, it would henceforth displace the state law in state court, because the state law
now squarely contradicts the federal common law. See supra text accompanying note
18. Indeed, reverse-Erie would have obligated the state courts to anticipate the exis-
tence of federal common law, and so displaced state law from the start. See infra text
accompanying note 144. Therefore, obstacle preemption would reappear through
the back door, leaving little or no reason to barricade the front door. Compare Clark,
supra note 19, at 1452-57 (necessarily coupling a view that would severely restrict
federal common law to a somewhat similar attack on obstacle preemption), with Ca-
2oo6]
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being narrowly limited, and often viewed 
on a background of a pre-
sumption against preemption.
28 Thus, broad thoughts about reverse-
Erie languish.
Other commentators, some of whom sense 
something in reverse-
Erie that goes beyond preemption, study 
it when focusing on the pro-
cedure to govern in a particular substantive 
context and sometimes
with a substantive result already in mind.
2 9 They tend to create exotic
doctrine for special occasions when federal 
procedure should trump
state procedure during state 
court litigation of federal-law 
issues. 30
Reverse-Erie in fact is more than the view 
of any of these commen-
tators, and indeed more than a combination 
of their views. The fact is
that many cases, such as those involving 
state court procedures and
federal-law claims, apply federal law 
in state court in circumstances
that preemption does not reach.
31 What is the applicable doctrine
that produces this result? To get at 
its actual content and possible
significance, renewing analysis from 
the beginning is necessary. Ac-
cordingly, I propose to launch into the 
overall relationship of state
and federal law applicable in state court. 
This broad reconception of
reverse-Erie thus subsumes both preemption 
and judicial choice of
law, while each informs the other.
3 2 After so generalizing the subject,
leb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 558-59 (2006)
(maintaining a robust role for federal 
common law and hence apparendy conceding
a proper role for obstacle preemption).
28 E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 484-85 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992); 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218,
230-31 (1947); see infra note 154.
29 E.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court 
Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 lIARv. L. 
REV.
1128, 1132 (1986) (studying inadequate 
state ground and federal habeas corpus 
doc-
trines "to establish a broad and flexible 
federal doctrine excusing procedural defaults
by state court litigants raising federal 
issues," and explaining that this common 
law
doctrine would apply in both state and 
federal courts); Neuborne, supra note 
5, at 787
(seeking "to establish a uniform and 
hospitable body of collateral rules governing
constitutional litigation in both state 
and federal court" in order to facilitate 
civil
rights enforcement).
30 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 29, at 
1190 (discussing the application of federal
standards "to determine the appropriateness 
of a state court forfeiture of a federal
claim in a criminal case").
31 See, e.g., DF.AHOZAL, supra note 15, 
at 84-86 (discussing case law).
32 See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law 
of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2097-2112
(2000). This fine article argues against 
the existence of any general presumption
against preemption, id. at 2092-97, and 
then describes a spectrum running from 
ex-
press preemption through conflict, obstacle, 
and field preemption to federal com-
mon law and dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis so that
the law of preemption should not be 
analyzed as conceptually discrete and
distinctive doctrines, but rather can be 
properly assessed only as part of a
spectrum of interrelated mechanisms whereby 
federal law displaces state law.
[VOL. 82"1- D AME LAW REVIEW
2oo61 
REVERSE-ERIE
I shall divide it up by using the familiar 
and largely unquestionable
framework of the differing institutional competencies 
of the Framers,
Congress, and courts. Such an analysis 
will make doctrinal labels such
as preemption and judicial choice of 
law fade into the background.
However, before so generalizing and 
subdividing vertical choice
of law in state court, the subject of the 
law applicable in federal court
deserves a few words. This brief detour 
into Erie will set the stage by
stating the institutional competencies that frame 
the general problem,
while going into detail only where relevant 
to the subsequent discus-
sion of reverse-Erie. It will also make 
the critical point that agreement
between reader and author on a particular 
methodology for resolving
specific Erie questions is not a prerequisite 
for following or even ac-
cepting this Article's discussion of 
reverse-Erie.
A. Law Applicable in Federal Court
As already suggested, preemption is a 
major doctrine that helps
in determining the reach of federal 
law for actions litigated in federal
court. But the preemption doctrine 
coexists with a ballyhooed choice-
of-law doctrine. The details of this 
coexistence have stimulated little
attention among scholars. Instead, 
they fixate in casebook and com-
mentary on the part of Erie that concerns 
judicial choice of law.
33
To understand as a whole the big picture 
of federalism, one must
first reconsider the institutional structure, 
including the constitutional
and congressional powers to limit judicial 
choice of law.
3 4 The federal
government may make the choice between 
state and federal law by its
ordinary hierarchy of lawmakers: the 
Federal Constitution, Congress
(or its authorized administrative delegate), 
or the federal courts. If
the Constitution or Congress expressly 
or impliedly made the choice
The spectrum includes not only the core 
statutory preemption doctrines but
also mechanisms whereby state law is displaced 
even without any relevant
congressional action.
Id. at 2097. Professor Dinh sees the decisional 
process as being basically the same
across this spectrum, with the difference 
as one enters the common law region being
"that the legislative action has been replaced by a common-law 
role," id. at 2109,
which will preempt inconsistent state law 
if the federal common law rests on "strong
or uniquely federal interests," id. at 2112. 
Although he hints at balancing in the dor-
mant Commerce Clause realm, id. at 2111, 
he does not give separate attention to
judicial choice of law under reverse-Erie, 
but rather treats the whole subject as gov-
erned by a preemption analysis focused on 
displacement of inconsistent state law. Id.
at 2097-98.
33 See, e.g., WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, 
§ 55 (presenting an excellent Erie dis-
cussion mainly focused on judicial choice 
between federal and state law).
34 See generally KEviN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES 
OF CrIL PROCEDURE § 3.2(A), (C)
(2005) (providing additional citations for 
the following abbreviated Erie summary).
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of law, that choice is binding on the federal 
courts.35 Only in the
absence of such a constitutional or congressional 
directive must the
federal courts decide whether state 
or federal law applies.
36 In fact,
then, this latter situation involving 
judicial choice of law in federal
actions represents a small part of the 
big picture, which I shall now
sketch.
1. First, Mostly Considering Separation 
of Powers
In addition to authorizing the making 
of much supreme federal
law, the Constitution could itself have 
dictated many choices that fed-
eral law govern particular points in 
federal court, and of course these
choices would be binding.
37 An example is the Seventh Amendment's
guarantee of trial by jury: the constitutional 
jury right directly governs
in all federal court cases, although 
not in state court cases.
38 Most
often, however, the Constitution did 
not so dictate that federal law
apply.
Where the Constitution did not choose 
federal law, the Constitu-
tion might have instead prohibited the 
federal authorities from choos-
ing to apply too much federal law. 
That is, the Constitution could
choose state law, as it generally did 
in establishing the limited federal
government.
39
In many circumstances, however, 
the Constitution did not
choose, leaving Congress able to make 
a valid choice by statute in
favor of federal law or state law. That 
is, within the just-described con-
stitutional limits lying at the two extremes, 
Congress can expressly or
impliedly make the choice of law between 
federal and state law for actions
litigated in federal court, 




If Congress chooses the applicable 
law, the only vertical choice-of-law
question remaining for the courts is 
whether that choice was constitu-




39 See CHEMERJNSKV, supra note 15, 
§ 3.1, at 234 (explaining the doctrine 
of lim-
ited federal legislative authority).
40 Compare, e.g., FED. R. Evin. 302 
(legislating that state law governs some 
pre-
sumptions in federal court), with, e.g., 
FED. R. EVID. 407 (legislating that federal 
law
governs admissibility in federal court 
of subsequent remedial measures). 
The Evi-
dence Rules, which were actually a federal 
statute, provide a nice source for compara-
ble examples throughout this section.
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tionally valid, because the Constitution imposes the only bounds on
the congressional power.
41
If Congress chooses federal law, and hence to preempt state law,
it usually specifies the content of that federal law,42 although it some-
times delegates to the federal courts the task of generating part or all
of that federal law.43 It is important to keep clear this distinction be-
tween choosing the applicable law and specifying its content.
Here, finally, is the main point: only in the absence of both a
constitutional and a congressional directive can the federal courts val-
idly choose to apply federal or state law. As already observed, this
court-drawn boundary is what many people narrowly term to be the
Erie question.
44
All the institutional actors are of interest here. But maximal ex-
posure of the choice process, in its systematic and rational form,
comes when we examine how federal courts choose between state and
federal law, for application to a particular issue in a case, in those
circumstances where the federal courts are free under the Constitu-
tion and federal legislation to go either way. Judicial choice, there-
fore, does merit the special attention it receives. So, when neither the
Constitution nor Congress has determined the law applicable to a new
situation-when neither has spoken on choice of law, and also when
the federal courts have not formerly settled the question-how can
and should a federal court exercise its residual choice-of-law power?
2. Next, Mostly Considering Federalism
The federal court is not determining whether pre-existing federal
law already covers the question, because if the law did, the court would
not be dealing with a situation of silence by the lawmakers above the
court in the lawmaking hierarchy. Instead, the court must look at fed-
eralism policies somehow to decide if federal law should govern. If so,
and because that federal law does not already exist, the court then
must create the federal law, most often by analogy or adoption. That
is, once the court chooses federal law, it must extend federal law by
creating specialized federal common law, which thereafter exists and
applies by stare decisis. 45
41 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967).
42 E.g., FED. R. Evmn. 601 (competency).
43 E.g., FED. R. Evi. 501 (privilege).
44 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
45 For a synopsis of the Erie doctrine's application to federal common law, see
WRic,-T & KANE, supra note 6, § 60.
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It is useful to recognize that the courts' choice-of-law power there-
fore equates to a lawmaking power. The outer boundary on the federal
courts' power to choose on their own to apply federal law is equivalent
to a judicial lawmaking power because, whenever the federal courts so
choose to apply federal law, they are extending, and hence making,
federal law.
4 6
Incidentally, Congress's powers to choose and make federal law
likewise equate. 47 The same constitutional limit applies to both con-
gressional powers. 4
8
Accordingly, the federal legislature and also (when that legisla-
ture is silent) the federal courts can choose and make federal law,
subject to their respective constitutional limit. Those limits, rooted in
federalism, permit significant lawmaking activity by the federal gov-
ernment. Yet limits must have some teeth, however stubby. Because
the Erie Court treated the limit on judicial power, but not the limit on
congressional power, 49 the relation between the two limits remains
unstated authoritatively. Nonetheless, it would seem that the bound-
ary demarcating constitutionally permissible matters for the federal
courts to reach with federal common law is more restrictive than the
boundary applicable to federal legislators.50 The lawmaking function
of Congress to create federal law for application in federal court is
thus more expansive, permitting greater intrusion into matters of
state interest. Congress may validly opt for federal law more often
than the federal courts can, because under our constitutional struc-
ture Congress should be the more active articulator of federal inter-
ests, while the courts must steer clear of blatantly formulating policies.
We need not pin down precisely those constitutional limits. In
federal court today, state law will apply in many situations where such
application is not constitutionally compelled-that is, where the fed-
eral authorities could make federal law-because the federal govern-
ment defers to state law by declining as a matter of comity to exercise
the full extent of its constitutional powers.51 Congress and the federal
courts could resolve any doubts in the hard cases under current doc-
46 See id. § 60, at 414-15.
47 Taking into account the peculiarities of treaty-making would require greater
verbal precision, but would end similarly. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
434-35 (1920).
48 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967).
49 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
50 See Paul J. Mishkin, Comment, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87
HARV. L. Rfv. 1682, 1683 (1974).




trine either way-in favor of the federal 
law or, for that matter, in
favor of the state law-without substantial 
fear of unconstitutional
usurpation or derogation of state or 
federal powers.
52 They truly are
choosing. In this sense, the Constitution 
does not enter into solving
the usual choice-of-law problem under 
the Erie doctrine. Congress
and the federal courts are largely free, 
as far as constitutional powers
go, to rationalize and rework the Erie 
doctrine.
In making its free choice, any federal 
actor obviously should exer-
cise its powers to choose between state 
and federal law in a way that
optimizes our system of federalism, 
even if optimality will inevitably
appear according to that actor's lights. 
Thus, when it legislates a
choice between state and federal law, 
Congress would ideally use a
methodology similar to the federal courts' 
Erie approach, although of
course Congress may be less systematic 
and rational in practice than
the courts. So, again, how do the courts 
choose?
3. Finally, Specifying a Judicial Choice-of-Law 
Methodology
Since the beginning, the Supreme Court, 
with the lower federal
courts in tow, has progressed through 
a sequence of choice-of-law
techniques for judicially handling the 
Erie problem as a matter of
comity. Today, federal law prevails if a 
Federal Rule covers the matter,
according to Hanna v. Plumer.
53 But for the rest of law, the Court has
not yet arrived at any truly clear or 
optimal solution.
Indeed, the variety of views is staggering-on 
this step in the
description of Erie, which is the step 
of judicial methodology, as op-
posed to the foregoing description 
of institutional competencies.
54
Some time ago I went to a talk on Erie 
and came away shocked. The
shock was that I basically agreed with 
the speaker. Over the years I
have heard and read so much about 
Erie, but so little with which I
agreed. I do not think my disagreements 
reflected my being out-of-
step, as virtually none of the speakers 
and writers agreed with each
other. It has always struck me as exceedingly 
odd that intelligent and
reasonable people could read such 
a small group of cases so wildly
differently. But that is an empirical fact: 
disagreement is rampant on
judicial choice-of-law methodology.
52 Id. § 3.2, at 144.
53 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (applying 
FED. R. Cv. P. 4 to provide the manner 
of
service of process in a diversity 
action).
54 See Bauer, supra note 7, at 
1255-63 (describing four methodologies 
used by
courts in choosing between a state 
law and conflicting federal common 
law); supra
notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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Anyway, for its illustrative worth, my view is that the courts do
evaluate (1) the state's interests, in light of all legitimate purposes or
policies reflected by the content of its law, in having its legal rule ap-
plied in federal court on this particular issue, in order to see if they
equal or outweigh the net sum of (2) the federal interests in having
federal law govern, which are called affirmative countervailing consid-
erations, and (3) the negative federal interest in avoiding the forum-
shopping and inequality effects of any outcome-determinative differ-
ence between state and federal law. This balance thus calls for appli-
cation of the law of the sovereign whose functions would be more
impaired by nonapplication.
Balancing here means the contextualized exercise ofjudgment in
the face of competing interests. 55 Admittedly, there can be an empti-
ness in principles that call for balancing, such as a principle saying
that the distribution of powers to federal and state governments must
be kept in balance. 56 But balancing can be an intelligible standard of
decision that avoids ad hocism, as long as it contains comprehensible
content for conceptualizing and resolving conflicts. The Erie balance
is not an empty metaphor and is instead an intelligible standard for
choice of law, even if malleable in application, because it provides a
"specification" of interests to put on the scales for weighing and then
prescribes a "criterion" in terms of the resulting position of the scales
for reaching an outcome.
57
Although today's Erie balance proceeds specific issue by specific
issue in any one case, this feature did not always appear inevitable.
The case law until recently seemed to have used balancing instead to
create a series of fairly general rules that soundly made the choice
between state and federal law for all the common subjects, and then
woodenly applied these general rules that allocated one subject to fed-
eral law and another subject to state law and so on. For two examples,
federal law governed if a Federal Rule was on point,5 8 while state law
55 SeeJackson, supra note 5, at 136-40.
56 See Robert Justin Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 TUL. L. REv. 93, 109 (2004)
("This Article shows that conceptualizing 'federalism as balance' relies on only an
unanalyzed, unexplicated, intuitive sense of balance totally devoid of even minimal
precision and lucidity for the purposes of describing, explaining, and justifying
federalism.").
57 See id. at 103-05, 124, 164.
58 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. To give a flavor of the debates here, on a point that
will become relevant later in this Article, I would maintain that in Hanna it was judi-
cial choice of law, rather than implied congressional command, that decided the
case-despite the fact that Professor Ely's revered article argued to the contrary. See




All agree that Hanna held that any pertinent 
Federal Rule will apply, even in
diversity cases, as long as it is valid under 
the Rules Enabling Act (REA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2000), and under the Constitution. 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-74. All also
agree that the motivation for this 
holding was that testing the applicability 
of the
Rules under the ordinary Erie test on 
a case-by-case basis "would eviscerate the 
Rules,"
including Rules on such central matters 
as pleadings and discovery. Ely, supra, 
at 721.
The remaining dispute is whether it 
was Congress in the 1934 REA or through 
the
1938 Rules that decided any Rules valid 
under the Act would have across-the-board
applicability, or whether it was the 1965 
Court in Hanna that decided to equate 
the
Rules' applicability to the validity test 
in order to insulate them from further 
Erie
attacks.
Contrary to then prevailing views, Ely 
contended that Congress, with intent, 
had
settled the potential Erie problem by 
providing for a set of Rules that were 
to apply in
all federal cases, in diversity and otherwise. 
Id. His position admittedly finds some
support in Hanna's language. See 380 
U.S. at 463 & n.3, 471, 474. Additionally, 
he
went beyond any hints in Hanna to argue 
that, under the REA's supersession clause,
the Rules repealed all prior conflicting 
laws, including the Rules of Decision 
Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). Ely, supra, at 718. 
But there are strong counterarguments 
to
his position.
First, Ely's argument concerning legislative 
intent is weak. There is no relevant
legislative history. In view of the chronology-the 
enactment of the REA in 1934, the
promulgation of the Rules by the Supreme 
Court on December 20, 1937, the argu-
ment of the Erie case on January 31, 
1938, the Erie decision on April 25, 
1938, the
effective date of the Rules on September 
16, 1938, and the threat to the Rules 
starting
only with Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 
U.S. 99 (1945), or Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)-it 
seems a bit far-fetched to attribute a legisla-
tive intent with respect to the effect of 
Erie on the Rules.
Second, the language of Hanna is ultimately 
ambiguous. Much of that language
concerning Congress deals with its general 
power to prescribe valid Rules, not with 
its
intention that every Rule should apply 
in every federal case. Hanna, 380 U.S. 
at
471-74. The Court arguably saw this 
latter question of applicability as left 
open by
Congress and by the Rules and therefore 
appropriate for decision by the Court 
itself.
The language of the Hanna opinion, id. 
at 472-73, and especially its telling quotation
from Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. 
v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 
1963)
(referring to affirmative countervailing 
considerations), can support the reading
that-in recognition of the federal interests 
in uniformity of practice, the unity of 
the
Rules, and their progressive content, and 
in view of the usually weak state interests
and slight outcome-determinative effect-the 
Hanna Court decided under Erie, once
and for all, that federal law should apply 
throughout the enclave of the Federal Rules.
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-74.
Third, Ely's argument based on the REA's 
repeal provision is not determinative
for several reasons. One could argue that 
§ 1652 comprises but part of Erie, and Erie
may not be a "law" within the meaning 
of the REA's repeal provision, and further-
more that Erie may not "conflict" with any 
valid Rules, but rather supplement them 
by
providing when they are to apply. True, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides
that the Rules "govern the procedure in 
the United States district courts in all suits 
of
a civil nature." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Yet one 
could read Rule 1 as being consistent with
Erie, in that the Rules are to govern only 
"procedure", but state "substantive" law 
can
displace them under Erie. Alternatively, 
one could sidestep Rule 1 by arguing 
that it
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governed horizontal choice of law.5 9 The courts created this series of
general rules by a sophisticated interest-balancing approach that re-
solved the vertical choice-of-law problem for a broad enclave of the
law.60 The courts then relied on a tough stare decisis attitude to pre-
vent the resultant general rule from later being eaten up by excep-
tions in appealing cases. 6' The long-term product of this method
would have been an extensive series of fairly workable and predictable
general rules that, when laid end-to-end, approximated the line be-
tween state and federal law ideally mandated by the goals of Erie.
Most recently, however, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,62
undercut any such sort of "generic balancing," or "sensitive rulemak-
ing," approach. In that diversity case the Court uttered its last major
words on Erie, although it neglected to make them clear words. It left
much to inference, but the Court at least held, first, that in the federal
district court, New York's tort reform interests called for applying the
state's aggressive new-trial standard for setting aside ajury verdict, but,
second, that federal interests still counted enough to call for applying
the deferential federal standard of appellate review in the federal
court of appeals.6 3 Most significantly, the holdings reimposed a case-
specific and issue-specific approach to balancing. First, the Court sur-
prisingly decided to apply state law to the district judge's scrutiny of
the jury decision, 64 a matter lying in the heartland of the judge-jury
relationship that had seemingly been confided to federal law by Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative.65 On that issue, the Gasperini
Court must have weighed the very specific state and federal interests
at stake on a case-by-case basis, leaving little room for stare decisis to
operate: only this kind of approach would have allowed federal judge-
jury law to prevail over South Carolina's weak interests in Byrd, while
subjugating it to New York's stronger tort reform interests in Gasper-
ini. Second, as Gasperini's different result on the appellate issue
exceeds the authorization of the REA and clashes particularly with Congress's intent
to determine the Rules' reach by the REA's second sentence limiting substantive ef-
fect. Finally, because the Erie doctrine did not reach into true procedure until after
Ragan in 1949, one could argue that this reach of Erie, even if it is a "law" that "con-
flicts" with the Rules, was a later creation not affected by the REA's repeal provision.
59 See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1975); Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
60 See, e.g., supra note 58.
61 See, e.g., Day & Zimmerman, 423 U.S. at 4.
62 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
63 Id. at 436-38.
64 Id. at 426-31.
65 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958) (applying federal law to provide that the jury should
decide a certain factual issue).
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proved, the Court balanced interests issue-by-issue 66 : only this kind of
approach would have allowed the compromise of applying state law
on one of the Erie issues in a case, while federal law governed another.
In sum, my view is that the Supreme Court is currently committed
to specific interest balancing. But, I stress, it is not essential to the rest
of this Article that the reader share my view on judicial methodology.
a. Resultant Realms of State and Federal Law
So, the law on Erie today is that the Constitution or Congress can
make a binding choice of law, and also that federal law prevails if a
Federal Rule covers the matter. Beyond those clear situations, the
choice of law is left to the federal courts, to be performed by one
methodology or another.
Nevertheless, the persisting dispute over judicial methodology
does not in fact leave the question of governing law terribly unclear.
In federal court today, state law will routinely apply in many situations.
And, under any conceivable methodology, federal law very often ap-
plies in federal question cases and often even in diversity cases, as a
consequence either of a constitutional or congressional choice or of
an already decided or relatively predictable judicial choice-of-law deci-
sion. The lack of clarity on vertical choice of law extends only to a
relatively small group of hard cases, and therein lies the explanation
of how our system can live with the lack of clarity. 67
A prime example of a hard case lay in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States,68 where the Court chose federal law, perhaps questionably, and
then created federal law to govern rights and duties of the United
States on its commercial paper.6 9 More generally, when will the fed-
eral courts on their own choose federal law and so displace state law?
This problem, sometimes called the " Clearfield problem,"70 is no more
than a restatement of the Erie problem described above. If the judi-
cial choice-of-law methodology developed under Erie ends up point-
ing to federal law rather than state law, then the federal courts will
choose federal law: besides Clearfield, examples range from the normal
filling of federal statutory interstices to inferring a private cause of
66 Ga-perini, 518 U.S. at 431-36.
67 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, § 59.
68 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (treating effect of the United States' delay in notifying
check's endorser of forgery).
69 Id. at 366--69.
70 E.g., Arthur D. Heilman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judicialy Act
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action from a federal statute
.7 1 Crudely put, the result of this judicial
choice of federal law has been 
the formation of a series of "enclaves"
72
where federal common law normally prevails, 
including "such narrow
areas as those concerned with the rights 
and obligations of the United
States, interstate and international disputes 
implicating the conflict-
ing rights of States or our relations with 
foreign nations, and admiralty
cases,"73 and also the area of uncodified 
federal procedure.
b. Content of Federal Common Law
If the choice points to federal law, the 
further question of its con-
tent arises. Oftentimes when federal 
law governs by nonjudicial
choice, the Constitution or Congress 
goes on to formulate the content
of the applicable federal law, which 
of course is then binding on the
federal courts. But in the two situations 
where federal law governs but
the Constitution and Congress have 
not formulated the applicable
federal law, the federal courts must 
step in to formulate specialized
federal common law. First, the federal 
courts might have to formulate
the law pursuant to a constitutional or 
congressional declaration that
chose federal law but explicitly or implicitly 
delegated to the courts
the formulation of that law.
74 Second, when the federal courts on
their own choose federal law, they also 
have to formulate its content,
as in Clearfield.
75 Thus, the federal common law ends 
up with this
vague definition: the body of federal 
rules of decision whose content
did not come directly from interpreting 
federal constitutional or stat-
utory provisions.
76
In performing the task of formulating 
that content of federal
common law, federal courts sometimes 
purely create common law or
more often simply extend some closely 
related or analogous federal
statutory provision.
77 But most often federal courts opt to 
adopt as
71 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (inferring a private
cause of action in a Title IX case); Textile 
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S.
448, 456-57 (1957) (filling big gaps in 
the federal Labor Management Relations 
Act
with federal law fashioned from the policy 
of national labor laws).
72 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
73 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 
Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes
omitted).
74 See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL 
J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART 
&
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND T14E FEDERAL SYSTEM 695 (5th ed. 2003) 
[here-
inafter HART & WECHSLERI.
75 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
76 See Bellia, supra note 5, at 832-33.
77 See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. 
Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-47
(1987) (subjecting civil RICO action 
to Clayton Act's four-year limitations 
period).
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federal law on the point in issue the appropriate state's law, which is
already formulated (although it may vary from state to state).78
Adoption of state law is the dominant process because it is a sim-
ple route to take, tends to reduce the federal courts' involvement in
lawmaking, and might also serve to accommodate any state interests
that may be at risk (but of insufficient weight to require application of
state law under Erie). Indeed, whenever unformulated federal law is
to govern, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of adopting state
law as the federal common law.79 That is, federal courts should so
adopt state law, unless there is a relatively significant federal interest
in uniformity of the federal law throughout the nation or there are
relatively important federal interests calling for a particular content to
the federal law or for particular limits on the content.80
Such optional adoption of state law as the federal common law is
distinguishable from the binding application of state law in federal
court under Erie in two big ways already intimated. First, when adopt-
ing a state's law, federal courts can adopt the appropriate state's law,
rather than the law that the forum state would apply.8' Second, fed-
eral courts can reject state law that impinges on those federal interests
calling for a certain content to or limits on the common law, so that a
78 See, e.g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989) (holding that in the absence
of a federal statute of limitations for a federally created claim, federal courts ordina-
rily should adopt the basic aspects of the forum state's statute of limitations for the
most closely analogous general type of state cause of action). But cf 28 U.S.C. § 1658
(2000 & Supp. 2003) (providing, beginning in 1990, a limitations period for future
federal enactments); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (hold-
ing § 1658 to be applicable if the claim was made possible by a post-1990 statutory
amendment). See generally Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Brian E. Pastuszenski & Mark E.
Greenwald, Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights
of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1011, 1043-49 (1980)
(describing the justifications supporting the federal courts' presumption to absorb
state limitations periods).
79 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979) (holding that
in the absence of a federal statute treating priority of liens in connection with federal
loans, federal courts should adopt the priority scheme of the appropriate state as long
as that scheme is nondiscriminatory).
80 Reassuringly, in this decision whether to adopt state law as federal law, the
arguments in favor of formulating a federal content are similar to those that we shall
see in the reverse-Erie scheme: affirmative countervailing considerations in favor of a
federal content and an outcome-determinative factor representing the interest in uni-
formity of federal law nationwide. Cf Neuborne, supra note 5, at 778-80 (conflating
reverse-Erie and adoption-of-state-law analyses).
81 See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740 (applying the law of the state where the
collateral was located).
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federal court may alter or ignore part or all of the relevant state law in
the particular case at bar.
2
B. Law Applicable in State Court
Determining the applicable law in state court involves the reverse-
Erie doctrine. Here, unlike in the Erie setting, the relevant federal law
will always be pre-existing, whether of constitutional, congressional, or
judicial origin.83 This fact means the Supremacy Clause is always in
play.84 The reverse-Erie question thus becomes whether existing fed-
eral law should displace state law in state court under the Supremacy
Clause. A role for preemption is obvious, but there is a role for judi-
cial choice of law too.
The reverse-Erie question is a relatively simple one if the Constitu-
tion or Congress (or its authorized administrative delegate) actually
chose to displace state law in state court. If the lawmaker expressly or
impliedly made federal law applicable in state court, that choice to
preempt is binding on the state courts under the Supremacy Clause,
provided that any such choice was valid under the rest of the
Constitution.8 5
However, in the absence of such a constitutional or congressional
directive, and in the absence of binding precedent, the state courts
and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court must decide whether the ex-
isting federal law applies in state court.8 6 The courts do so by employ-
ing not only implied-preemption analysis but also a federally
mandated judicial choice-of-law methodology similar to the Erie meth-
odology. Just as the Erie methodology itself is specialized federal com-
mon law, the reverse-Erie judicial choice-of-law methodology is a
federal-common-law creation of the U.S. Supreme Court that the state
courts must follow.
If those reverse-Erie methodologies yield a choice in favor of fed-
eral law, that choice is binding on the state courts under the
Supremacy Clause. Thus, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co.,817 an interstate water case decided in an opinion by Justice
Brandeis on the same day as his Erie opinion, held that substantive
82 See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1946) (reading a fed-
eral tolling notion into a state statute of limitations for a particular federal action on a
federally created claim).
83 See infra text accompanying notes 139-46
84 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
86 See Bellia, supra note 5, at 840-45.
87 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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federal common law, which would govern in the federal courts,88 also
binds the state courts. But if those methodologies yield a choice in
favor of state law, the state is left free to create and apply it. Thus,
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,8 9 on re-
view of the Oregon Supreme Court, held that state law solely gov-
erned the disputed ownership of lands along a navigable river inside
the state, after the lands had become riverbed because of avulsive
changes in the river's course. 0
By such means a great amount of federal law-be it constitu-
tional, statutory, or common law-flows down to apply in state courts.
A lot of it arrives via the preemption doctrine, but some of it undenia-
bly results from judicial choice of federal law for state courts.
1. Constitutional Limits on This Choice of Law
There exist constitutional limits on the powers of Congress and
the Supreme Court to choose the applicable law for application in
state court. The limits on imposing federal law on the state courts are
quite significant, albeit in practice rather vague. Most prominently,
the federal government cannot extend beyond the relevant bounda-
ries demarcating the matters constitutionally reserved to the states. 9 1
Despite their significance, these constitutional limits are like
those controlling the Erie scheme, and so do not warrant renewed dis-
cussion. It suffices here to observe anew that the Federal Constitution
itself made some binding choices of law for state courts. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a nice
example.
92
2. Legislative Limits on This Choice of Law
Analogously to Erie, Congress can expressly or impliedly make the
choice between state and federal law for application in state court, but
of course only within constitutional limits. A valid congressional
choice will bind the state courts. That is, if Congress chooses the ap-
plicable law, the only vertical choice-of-law question remaining for the
courts is whether that choice was constitutionally valid, because the
Constitution imposes the only bourds on the congressional power.9"
88 Id. at 110; see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
89 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
90 Id. at 381.
91 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
92 Id. amend. XIV.
93 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1208-09 (2006);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984).
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At the heart of congressional choice of 
law lies the doctrine of
express preemption. For example, in some 
areas, such as patents,
Congress can decide to regulate and then specify 
substantive laws that
will apply in federal and state courts henceforth.
94 Or Congress can
provide procedural regulations for state 
courts' handling of certain
types of federal-law cases.
95 Indeed, the more illuminating choice-of-
law problems in state courts arise as the 
disputed issue moves from the
purely substantive to the more procedural. 
Substantive preemption is
particularistic to some specific legal context, 
while displacement of
state procedural law is more generalizable 
and hence revealing, just as
the more procedural questions are the 
more instructive in the Erie
context.
In all such cases of express preemption, 
the courts are deciding
only whether the federal statute was 
"meant" to displace state law.
Sometimes that decision is a straightforward 
task. But Congress's pur-
pose can be elusive. As the courts move 
from discerning implications
toward making inferences and otherwise 
more self-consciously decid-
ing the extent of federal law on their own, 
the courts tend to make
less use of implied-preemption doctrine 
and terminology and to in-
voke more obviously a choice-of-law approach 
analogous to Erie's judi-
cial choice-of-law doctrine
.96
3. Judicial Methodology for This Choice 
of Law
Analogously to Erie, the courts must use 
some technique for
choosing between state and federal law 
for application in state court,
whenever-under the Constitution, federal 
statutes, and binding pre-
cedent-they may go either way. Also as 
in Erie, the judicial choice-of-
law cases best explicate the dividing line 
between state and federal
law, and so deserve the most careful 
study. Finally, as that study will
show, this judicial methodology relates 
more to the Erie line of cases
than to traditional preemption case law.
94 See Donald Shelby Chisum, The 
Allocation ofJurisdiction Between State 
and Federal
Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WAsH. L. REV. 
633, 657-64 (1971).
95 As to the limit on congressional 
authority to legislate on the operation 
of state
courts in state-law cases, compare Bellia, 
supra note 16, at 950-51 (arguing that 
Con-
gress cannot regulate "state court 
procedures" for enforcing "state law 
cases"), with
finks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 
456, 461-63 (2003) (upholding a 
federal tolling
statute for state-law claims). See also 
AnthonyJ. Bellia Jr., Congressional Power 
and State
Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEo. L.J. 949 (2006) 
(extending the focus to congressional 
con-
trol of state jurisdiction in state-law 
cases).
96 See Davis, supra note 7, at 198-200.
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a. Choice-of-Law Role for Courts, As Mandated by U.S.
Supreme Court
Of course, reverse-Erie predates the Erie case,97 just as the Erie
problem itself predates Erie, both problems being as old as federalism
itself. But sophisticated refinement of reverse-Eie methodology had
to await the modern developments on the Erie front. Since Erie's deci-
sion, the leading reverse-Erie cases on judicial choice of law have been
Brown,98 Dice,99 Felder,100 and Johnson' 01-respectively, two early and
two recent cases; two Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) cases
and two § 1983 civil rights cases; two sounding in judicial choice of law
and two sounding in preemption; but all involving whether federal
procedural law binds the state courts.
In Brown, the plaintiff brought an FELA case in a Georgia state
court, alleging that he had suffered injury while working when he
stepped on a large clinker lying in the railroad yards, but he failed to
allege the clinker's circumstances in a way to constitute the railroad's
negligence and to exclude alternative causes. 10 2 The railroad de-
murred. Contrary to federal practice, a Georgia rule construed allega-
tions most strongly against the pleader and so resulted in dismissal of
the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.10 3 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that the Georgia pleading rule had to bow to the
more lenient federal practice:
Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnec-
essary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal
laws .... Should this Court fail to protect federally created rights
from dismissal because of over-exacting local requirements for me-
97 See, e.g., Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923) (Holmes, J.) (rejecting a
state pleading rule that deemed a federal official to have waived a federal venue de-
fense in a state personal-injury case, and observing: "Whatever springes the State may
set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion
of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the
name of local practice."); S. Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632, 639-41 (1916) (forcing
federal common law on a state court as to the obligation of carriers under the Inter-
state Commerce Act); Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 510-13 (1915) (forcing
federal common law on a state court as to the burden of persuasion under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act); Bellia, supra note 5, at 898 n.334.
98 Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
99 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
100 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
101 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
102 Brown, 338 U.S. at 295.
103 Id.
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ticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in adjudication of 
federally
created rights could not be 
achieved.
1 0 4
In Dice, the plaintiff brought an FELA 
action in an Ohio state
court.105 The railroad's defenses included 
a release of all claims that
was signed by the plaintiff.
106 The plaintiff contended that the pur-
ported release was void because he had 
relied on the defendant's de-
liberately false statement that the document 
was merely a receipt for
back wages. 10
7 The Ohio Supreme Court, reversing the 
intermediate
appellate court, sustained the trial court's 
entry of judgment for the
defendant notwithstanding the verdict, 
holding (1) that Ohio, not
federal, law governed the validity of the 
release, and under that Ohio
law the release bound the plaintiff, 
a man of ordinary intelligence
who could read, even though a deliberately 
false statement had in-
duced him to sign, and (2) that under 
controlling Ohio law, all issues
as to fraud in the execution of this release 
were properly decided by
the judge rather than by the jury.
10 8 The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the more protective 
federal common law con-
trolled the validity of the release and 
that the "factual" issues as to
fraud had to be determined by the jury: 
"It follows that the right to
trial by jury is too substantial a part of 
the rights accorded by the Act
to permit it to be classified as a mere 
'local rule of procedure' for
denial in the manner that Ohio has 
here used."'10 9
In Felder, an arrestee named Bobby Felder 
brought a federal civil
rights action in a Wisconsin state court 
against Milwaukee and certain
of its police officers, alleging racially 
motivated police brutality. 
10 Al-
104 Id. at 298-99 (Black, J.); see Hill, supra 
note 5, at 407 & n.1
4 3. Justice Frank-
furter's dissent spoke more explicitly in terms 
of the Erie analogy, feeling that proce-
dure should be left to nondiscriminatory 
state law. See Brown, 338 U.S. at 301
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the line between state and federal law
should be drawn "in precisely the same way 
in which we have applied them in reverse
situations-when confronted with the problem 
whether the Federal courts respected
the substance of State-created rights, 
as required by the rule in Erie" and 
that Brown
"presents essentially the same kind of problem as that with which 
this Court dealt in"
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 
(1945), Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Ware-
house Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), and Cohen 
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 555 (1949)).
105 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown 
R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
106 Id. at 360.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 361.
109 Id. at 363 (Black, J.) (citing Brown, 
338 U.S. at 296). Justice Frankfurter's 
dis-
sent again spoke in terms of the Erie 
analogy. See id. at 367-68 (Frankfurter, 
J., dis-
senting) (drawing the line again at nondiscriminatory 
procedure).
110 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 135 
(1988).
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though the plaintiff had satisfied Wisconsin's 
three-year statute of lim-
itations for general personal-injury actions, 
the officers moved to
dismiss for failure to comply with 
Wisconsin's notice-of-claim stat-
ute. 1I That statute provides that, before 
any suit may be brought in
state court against a municipality or 
its officer, the plaintiff must addi-
tionally give notice of the claim to 
the defendant within 120 days of
the injury; that the municipality 
then has 120 days to act on the 
re-
quested relief; and that the plaintiff 
must bring the suit within six
months after notice of the claim's 
disallowance.'
1 2 The defendants'
motion ultimately succeeded in 
state court.
113 The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed:
Because the notice-of-claim statute at 
issue here conflicts both in its
purpose and effects with the remedial 
objectives of § 1983, and be-
cause its enforcement in such actions 
will frequently and predict-
ably produce different outcomes in § 
1983 litigation based solely on
whether the claim is asserted in state 
or federal court, we conclude
that the state law is pre-empted when 
the § 1983 action is brought
in a state court.
... Just as federal courts are constitutionally 
obligated to apply
state law to state claims, . . . so too 
the Supremacy Clause imposes
on state courts a constitutional duty 
"to proceed in such manner




Thus, although the Court's terminology 
moved toward preemption,
its actual analysis came more overtly 
to resemble Eri's progeny.
In Johnson, a worker named Kristine 
Fankell brought a federal
civil rights action in an Idaho state 
court, alleging that she had been
fired from her state government job 
without due process.
1 1 5 The de-
fendant officials unsuccessfully moved 
for dismissal on the ground of
qualified immunity, and then tried 
to appeal immediately. The state
supreme court dismissed the appeal 
under its finality rule, even
though federal law would 
have allowed an interlocutory 
appeal.1
1 6
111 Id. at 136.
112 Id. at 136-37 (citing Wis. STAT. 
§ 8 9 3.80(l)(a)-(b) (1983 
& Supp. 1987)).
113 Id. at 137.
114 Jd. at 138, 151 (Brennan, J.) (quoting 
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317
U.S. 239, 245 (1942), and citing Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79
(1938)). Justice O'Connor's dissent expressly 
attacked the "reverse-Erie" tone of the
majority as "a sort of upside-down theory of 
federalism." Id. at 161 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
115 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 
913 (1997).
116 Id. at 913-1
4 .
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The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. 117 After noting "our normal pre-
sumption against pre-emption,"' 8 it sequentially found (1) that the
"dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state Rule regard-
ing the administration of the state courts,"' 19 (2) that the federal in-
terests at stake lay in the procedural appealability doctrine rather than
in the substantive qualified-immunity doctrine, 20 and (3) that appli-
cation of the state rule was not "outcome-determinative" in the Felder
sense.12 It then balanced the state's "countervailing considerations"
regarding "the operation of its courts" against the relatively weak fed-
eral interests, at least as the Court viewed them. 122 Thus, the Court
put a limit on federal intrusion into state court procedure.
What other quasi-procedural realms has the Supreme Court
treated? The influence of the four leading cases has spread beyond
their facts, to realms near and far. For example, federal law might
apply in state courts on matters such as burden of proof, joinder, and
venue.' 23 Federal attorney's fee law applies in state court on some
federal claims, 2 4 just as state attorney's fee law would normally apply
in federal court on state claims.1 25 Similarly, the federal law of res
judicata governs the effects of a federal judgment in a state court,
126
117 Id. at 913 (Stevens, J., for unanimous Court). This case involved a defendant
asserting a federal immunity, rather than a plaintiff asserting a federal right, but the
analysis did not and should not turn on that point. See PETER W. LOW & JOHlN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 64-65 (5th
ed. 2004). But see LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 519-20 (3d
ed. 2004).
118 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 919-20.
121 Id. at 920.
122 Id. at 922.
123 See Neuborne, supra note 5, at 736-37, 767 n.173; see also Paul J. Katz, Com-
ment, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing Doctrine, and the Reverse-Erie
Analysis, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1316-17 (2005) (discussing how standing require-
ments of state courts can affect federal procedural rules in different ways). Relatedly,
federal jurisdictional law might conceivably apply in state courts under the reverse-
Erie doctrine. See David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 56 FoRDHtAm L. Ruv. 1, 49-51 (1987). But cf. Am. Dredging Co. v.
Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 (1994) (applying state forum non conveniens law).
124 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (applying federal attorney's fee
law in a state court action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
125 See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRiG-T, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511, at 365 n.93 (2d ed. 1996).
126 See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 316
n.100 (1993) ("In essence, federal common law endows federal judgments with the
same obligatory effects as the full faith and credit statute provides for state judg-
ments .... "). This result follows from the strong federal interests in defining the
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and, conversely, state res judicata law would normally govern the ef-
fects of a state judgment in a federal court.
127
The best illustrations of the reach of the Supreme Court's re-
verse-Erie cases come from jury practice. The uncontroversial back-
ground is that state jury practice is widely similar to the federal, but it
need not be; very importantly, the Seventh Amendment is not incor-
porated or implicit in Fourteenth Amendment due process, hence
does not apply to the states, and so does not constrain state civil trials;
and for state-law claims, the states in fact have generally not followed
the Supreme Court's modern expansion of the jury right t28 Yet, fed-
eral jury practice may apply in state courts under the reverse-Erie doc-
trine. 129 In the converse situation, state jury practice normally does
scope of federal judgments, in adapting that resjudicata law to the federal procedural
system, and in developing a uniform federal law of res judicata and a simple re-
troverse approach to judgments in a federal system. However, when the basis of fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction in the first court was diversity, the Supreme Court has
pronounced that this federal law will adopt the first court's local state law of res judi-
cata as the federal common law, except when that state law is incompatible with fed-
eral interests. In Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497
(2001), the Court reviewed the respect a Maryland state court owed to a statute-of-
limitations dismissal by a California federal court in a removed diversity case and held:
In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismis-
sal by a federal court sitting in diversity....
... This is, it seems to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally
prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in
the State in which the federal diversity court sits....
This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situa-
tions in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.
Id. at 508-09. Given the particular federal interests at play here, a better approach
for diversity judgments might be to invert the Court's presumption, so as normally to
apply a uniform federal res judicata law and only sometimes to adopt the state res
judicata law, when state substantive policies spike high, such as for nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel. See Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72
U. CIN. L. REv. 527, 594-98 (2003).
127 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). However, sometimes federal law has a role. Be-
sides existing exceptions to § 1738, the state resjudicata law itself is not free of federal
command, Most importantly, due process requires that the state not preclude on the
basis of a judgment if the proceedings did not afford a full and fair opportunity to
litigate. That is, the state must have a basically fair resjudicata law, which will apply in
that state's own courts as well as in federal court to specify the effects of that state's
judgments. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-83 (1982).
128 See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR
A BAsic COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 133-34, 1414 (8th ed. 2003).
129 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1980) (holding that, in
state court FELA cases, federal law governs jury instruction); Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (holding that, in state court FELA cases,
federal law governs jury right). The Supreme Court has followed Norfolk, looking to
20061
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not apply in federal courts under the Erie 
doctrine. 130 And so some
dissimilarity between reverse-Erie 
and Erie begins to emerge.-
31
b. Choice-of-Law Role for Courts, As Applied 
by State Courts
State courts provide cases similar to the 
U.S. Supreme Court
cases. 132 State courts could potentially produce 
most of the reverse-
Erie law.133 Yet these state cases are not 
terrifically illuminating, be-
federal law on measure-of-damages jury instructions 
in a reverse-Erie case and thereby
deciding that the defendant in a state court 
FELA action could have a present-value-
of-future-losses instruction. See St. Louis 
Sw. Ry. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 412
(1985) (summarily granting certiorari and 
reversing per curiam); see also Monessen
Sw. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 339-42 (1988) 
(holding that, in such a case, present-
value calculation is the jury's task). But 
the Supreme Court years ago allowed the
state court to apply its own nonunanimity 
rule in an FELA case. Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 218-19 
(1916). See generally Neuborne, supra
note 5, at 772-74 (discussing when courts 
apply state or federal jury rules).
130 See Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 
(1963); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). But cf Gasperini 
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 426-31 (1996) (applying state law to 
a district court's decision on granting a new
trial).
131 See infra text accompanying notes 
169-72 (explaining dissimilarity).
132 See Neuborne, supra note 5, at 770-75.
133 The question of what law applies in 
state court could arise in a lower federal
court. For example, that question implicitly 
arises when the federal court, in the
course of deciding an Erie choice-of-law 
issue, considers the outcome-determinative
factor and hence must resolve what law would 
apply in state court. But the fact is that
no federal court has waxed informative in 
that setting on the subtleties of reverse-Erie.
The question arises more explicitly when 
the federal court, having decided that
state law applies in the federal court under 
Erie, considers the state law's content and
hence the extent to which federal law 
has preempted or displaced state law. 
Al-
though this setting could conceivably generate 
frequent and enlightening discussion
of reverse-Erie, the overwhelming majority 
of federal cases that get into explicit discus-
sions are admiralty cases, apparently because 
the Supreme Court so framed the issue
in one such case. See Offshore Logistics, 
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986)
("[Tlhe extent to which state law may be 
used to remedy maritime injuries is con-
strained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine 
which requires that the substantive reme-
dies afforded by the States conform to governing 
federal maritime standards."). Most
of these admiralty cases just observe that the 
same substantive law applies in state and
federal courts, so that diversity and admiralty 
claims should receive the same treat-
ment. See, e.g., Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned 
Vessel, Known as "New York," 162
F.3d 63, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1998). However, 
some admiralty cases, in the course of deter-
mining the law for application in federal 
court, get into more interesting discussions
of preemption of state law. See, e.g., Ballard 
Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d
623, 626-31 (1st Cir. 1994) (allowing application 
of a Rhode Island statute for recov-
ery of economic loss from damage to natural 
resources).
Only occasionally do lower federal courts, 
in other than these quintessentially
Erie settings, decide directly whether the state 
court itself would apply federal law. For
example, a federal court might have to decide 
if preemption makes a state-law claim
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yond suggesting that state courts are dutiful in trying to follow the
U.S. Supreme Court's lead, at least when they see the issue.11 4
Thus, in adjudicating federal-law claims, state courts apply federal
law on clearly substantive questions, 135 and generally state courts ap-
pleaded in state court nevertheless removable. See, e.g., Watson v. Symons Corp., 121
F.R.D. 351, 355 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (saying that preemption of the field of labor-
management relations made case removable); cf Daniel Jordan Simon, Comment,
Abstention Preemption: How the Federal Courts Have Opened the Door to the Eradication of
"Our Federalism," 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1355, 1380-84 (2005) (discussing an analogous
setting). Or a federal court, in deciding whether to issue an antisuit injunction, might
have to perform a reverse-Erie analysis to determine what law the state court would
apply. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 319-25 (5th Cir. 1987)
(examining whether federal maritime law displaces state law), rev'd on other grounds,
486 U.S. 140 (1988); Villar v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1467, 1485-86 (S.D.
Tex. 1992) (same), affd, 990 F.2d 1489 (5th Cir. 1993); cf Diesel "Repower," Inc. v.
Islander Invs. Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (involving a similar setting).
134 See, e.g., Bowman v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 142 N.E.2d 104, 114 (Ill. 1957) (ruling that
in state court FELA cases, federal law governs new-trial availability and standard,
under Dice); Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 21-28 (Wash. 1993) (rul-
ing that in state court admiralty cases, federal law precludes application of state-law
remedy for economic loss of yachts, under reverse-Erie doctrine). Compare Axess Int'l
Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 1, 7 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that in state
court admiralty cases, state law normally governs the right to attorney's fees, with the
court saying that this result "depends on a balancing of the federal and state interests
involved"), with Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1995)
(ruling that in federal court admiralty cases, federal law normally governs the right to
attorney's fees).
There are literally millions of state cases applying reverse-Erie, because the
choice-of-law issue is ubiquitous. SeeJAMEs E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES or FEDERALJuRIS-
DICTION § 6.5, at 138 (2006) (noting that the "problem arises with monotonous regu-
larity"). But most such applications are intuitive. Few cases shed light on the
appropriate methodology. A search for all state cases in Westlaw that were aware
enough to refer to reverse-Erie by name yields only forty-seven cases through 2005.
Again, most of these cases, thirty-seven of them in fact, were admiralty cases, which
carefully followed the complicated relationship there between federal and state law.
See, e.g., Rodrigue v. LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 253 (La. 1990) ("As the author of the
only treatise on the relationship between state law and federal maritime law has ex-
plained the process, courts balance the 'federal interest against the countervailing
state interests in regulating local activity and in providing relief to its citizens from
personal injury impairment."' (quoting DAVID W. ROBERTSON, AbMIRALTY AND FEDER-
ALISM 195 (1970))). The ten nonadmiralty cases are cited and discussed infra notes
135-37 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the only U.S. Supreme Court
review given to any of these forty-seven cases affirmed the highest state court's applica-
tion of the state law of forum non conveniens, after that state court had reversed the
lower courts' application of federal law. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
447 (1994).
135 See, e.g., Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Minn. 2003) (ruling
that federal law governs successor-employer liability under Title VII); Mfrs. Auto Leas-
ing, Inc. v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex. App. 2004) (ruling that
2oo6]
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ply state law on clearly procedural questions.
136 On the classic
problems in between, such as statutes 
of limitations, the state courts
come out the same way on reverse-Erie1
37 that federal courts do in the
Erie setting, 38 with each deferring to the 
other sovereign.
If the state court determines that federal 
law governs, then the
state court applies it. The federal law might 
be constitutional, statu-
tory, or common law; it might be purely 
federal, or it might involve
state law adopted as federal common 
law; it might be fully formulated
or more incipient. Sometimes the state 
court has to be the very first to
enunciate federal law. It has authority 
to do so, if it decides in accor-
dance with existing federal law by trying 
to discern what the federal
courts would decide is the law, rather 
than by undertaking to formu-
late federal law either in pursuit of 
strictly forward-looking policies
that might guide a legislature or in accordance 
with nonpositivist prin-
ciples that might guide a freely law-creating 
court.1 39 That is, the state
court should act as federal courts do 
when applying state law under
federal law governs the standard for enhanced 
damages under the Federal Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)).
136 See, e.g, Rudgayzer & Gratt v. Cape 
Canaveral Tour & Travel, Inc., 799 N.Y.S.2d
795, 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (ruling 
that state law governs joinder under 
TCPA);
Rudgayzer & Gratt v. LRS Commc'ns, 
Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603 (N.Y. App. 
Term
2004) (ruling that state law governs joinder 
by terms of TCPA); Ganci v. Cape Canav-
eral Tour & Travel, Inc., No. 18462/03, 
2004 WL 1469372, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Apr.
15, 2004) (ruling that state law governs 
joinder under TCPA). But cf Ill. Cent. 
Gulf
R.R. v. Price, 539 So. 2d 202, 206 (Ala. 
1988) (ruling that the content of FED. 
R. CIV.
P. 25(a) governs under FELA, with the 
court observing that by "the concepts 
of civility
and courtesy (which we reach before 
we reach the concept that an Alabama 
law that
interferes with a federal law must yield), 
we defer to federal law, whether it 
be sub-
stantive or procedural, in enforcing a 
federal cause of action, just as the federal 
courts
have deferred to State law, whether it 
be substantive or procedural"), explained 
infra
text accompanying notes 169-72.
137 See, e.g., Corp. Sec. Group v. 
Lind, 753 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App.
2000) (ruling that federal law governs 
who decides arbitrability under the Federal
Arbitration Act); David L. Smith & Assocs. 
v. Advanced Placement Team, Inc., 169
S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App. 2005) (ruling 
that federal law governs statute of limita-
tions under TCPA, although here it adopts 
state law as federal law); Chair King, 
Inc. v.
GTE Mobitnet, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 
389-92 (Tex. App. 2004) (same); Mohamed 
v.
Exxon Corp., 796 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 
App. 1990) (ruling that federal law governs
the effect of a federal judgment in 
a civil rights action).
138 See 19 WIG1HT ET AL., supra note 
125, § 4511 (summarizing Erie resolutions 
of
the classic problems).
139 See Bellia, supra note 5, at 889.
REVERSE- ERIE
Erie. 4 0 In both the Erie setting and the reverse-Erie setting, the court's
job is to apply the other sovereign's law, not to create law for it.
If the content of the governing federal law is really unclear, how
should the state court determine that content? No undisputed answer
exists to this pervasive question,' 4 1 which is obviously fundamental
enough to occur regularly to my first-year students and which is thus
illustrative of how unexplored all reverse-Erie matters remain. Specifi-
cally, the question of whether state courts are bound by lower federal
courts on the federal law's content remains open. 142 The better
view-mainly trying to effectuate the constitutional status of state
courts, while accepting some local disuniformity in the short term-is
that the state court should try to determine what the U.S. Supreme
Court would rule.1 43 On the one hand, the state court should not
consider itself actually bound, rather than merely informed, by the
local federal courts' rulings. On the other hand, the state court would
naturally be bound under stare decisis by decisions within the state's
hierarchy of courts as to the federal law's content.
This closer consideration suggests that Erie and reverse-Erie do
not impose strictly the same task on the courts: Erie is telling the fed-
eral court when to apply and if necessary create federal law, while re-
140 See id. at 908 n.369. But cf Robert A. Schapiro, Interurisdictional Enforcement of
Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1425-29 (2005) (arguing for
the legitimacy of a more active role for federal courts in interpreting state law).
141 No federal statute authorizes certification of unsettled questions from state
courts to a federal court. Indeed, certification to a lower federal court, rather than to
the U.S. Supreme Court, would denigrate the state courts' status as equally competent
enunciators of what the Supreme Court would say as to federal law. Cf FIELD ET AL.,
supra note 128, at 346-47 (criticizing certification by federal courts to a state court on
additional grounds).
142 Comparatively thorough treatment appears in WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6,
§ 45, at 294 n.25 (noting "interesting question" in footnote).
143 See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir.
1970); Corp. Sec. Group v. Lind, 753 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("Thus
it is clear that we did not simply decide to follow the holding of the local federal
appellate court on this issue. Instead we applied a 'reverse-Erie' method in which we
felt obligated to decide the issue as we believed the United States Supreme Court
would do so if it were instead considering the matter." (footnote omitted)); Hall v. Pa.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859 (Pa. 2004); Bellia, supra note 5, at 839 n.64; cf
Charles L. Black, Jr., Is the State of Georgia in the Fifth Circuit?, 81 YALE L.J. 30, 31 (1971)
("[T]he political structure known as 'The State of Georgia' is in no sense and in no
way encompassed 'within' the appellate power of the [then] Fifth Circuit."). But see
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991). See generally Donald H. Zeigler,
Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain
Federal Law, 40 Wm. & MAv L. REv. 1143 (1999) (describing the division in case law,




verse-Erie is telling the state court when to apply 
existing federal law so
as to displace state law under the command 
of the Supremacy
Clause. 144 The state court may have to envisage 
a federal court's Erie
analysis to determine the reach of federal 
law, and may have to enun-
ciate unclear federal law, but it is merely 
a federal-law-applier and will
never act as a federal lawmaker in the true 
sense. To say it once again,
it will decide in accordance with existing 
federal law, but never create
federal law. Still, the difference does not 
deserve exaggeration. After
all, in theory the lower federal courts too 
are attempting to discern
what the Supreme Court would do.
Finally, do note the profound implication 
of this view of the state
court role
1 45 : it makes the state courts into judicial 
hierarchies that
can independently enunciate federal law, 
parallel to the lower federal
courts and subject only to rare U.S. Supreme 
Court review.'
46 A state
is not bound by any coequal court system, 
either the lower federal
courts or, for that matter, another state's 
courts. But a state is not free
just to go its own way, because at bottom 
we are talking about a state
applying federal law under the constraint 
of the Supremacy Clause.
This is no place to let a thousand flowers 
bloom. The state courts are
under a duty to follow what the U.S. Supreme 
Court has decided or
would rule.
144 See Dinh, supra note 32, at 2088-92 
(showing that the Supremacy Clause ap-
plies only to existing law).
145 Among practical reverberations, this 
view complicates any consideration of the
outcome-determinative factor in reverse-Erie 
analysis, albeit in a way perhaps too rar-
efied to be taken into account by courts. 
As one court has explained:
Under the Erie doctrine, of course, a federal 
district court must apply the law
of the state in which it sits when ruling 
on state law questions. Thus,
whether a case comes before a state or a 
federal court does not affect what
law will govern its resolution.
When the case involves a federal question, 
however, the reverse of Erie
does not apply. "[Tlhe Supremacy Clause 
imposes on state courts a constitu-
tional duty 'to proceed in such manner 
that all the substantial rights of the
parties under controlling federal law [are] 
protected."' State courts need
not, however, apply the law of the federal 
district in which they sit when
ruling on questions of federal law. Thus, 
the law governing a particular case
may differ depending on whether the 
case winds up in a state or federal
courts.
Watson v. Symons Corp., 121 F.R.D. 351, 
354 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (citations omitted)
(quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 
133 (1988)).
146 See Michael E. Solimine, The Future 
of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457,
1473-78 (2005).
[VOL. 82:1
,-- DAME. LAW REVIEW
REVERSE-ERIE
c. Judicial Choice-of-Law Methodology, Fleshed Out
All this reverse-Erie case law has established that state courts must
perform a choice-of-law process mandated by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Admittedly, the cases fail to express a clearly developed
choice-of-law methodology, often not going beyond a wooden refer-
ence to preemption here or some vague reference to Erie there. Teas-
ing out a methodology therefore becomes the project.
Reading the evocative state cases-those that raise a quasi-proce-
dural issue in a federal claim when neither express preemption nor
even direct conflict with a federal statute is in play-generates a reali-
zation that here any search for preemptive congressional intent is un-
realistic and that the courts must on their own face competing state
and federal interests. In other words, the problem has morphed from
classic preemption into a choice of law that requires an Erie-like judi-
cial methodology.
Then, upon closer examination, the courts in many of these re-
verse-Erie cases do appear to employ a judicial choice-of-law methodol-
ogy at least similar to the one worked out by the Erie line of cases
down to Gasperini, most often doing so implicitly but sometimes ex-
plicitly) 4 7 In my view, the lower courts, just as the Supreme Court did
in Johnson,148 balance the state's interests in having its legal rule ap-
plied in state court on this issue in this case against the federal inter-
ests in having federal law displace the rule of this particular state,
while trying to avoid differences in outcome.
Just as in the Erie setting, reverse-Erie balancing means no more
than the contextualized exercise of judgment in the face of compet-
ing interests.' 49 There are other statements of the choice-of-law stan-
dard floating around, such as that federal common law applies in the
state courts when a federal rule of decision is "'necessary to protect
147 See, e.g., Milstead v. Diamond M Offshore, Inc., 676 So. 2d 89, 94 (La. 1996)
(observing in an admiralty case that "the United States Supreme Court has made clear
that the decision whether to apply a state rule must be based upon a balancing of
state and federal interests"); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Comm'r of Labor &
Indus., 608 P.2d 1047, 1060 (Mont. 1979) ("weighing and balancing state and federal
interests" under NLRA), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Local 1804, Int'l Long-
shoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n, 428 A.2d 1283, 1288 (N.J. 1981) ("balanc-
ing" in an ERISA case); Axess Int'l Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 1, 7 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001) (observing in an admiralty case that the result "depends on a balancing of
the federal and state interests involved").
148 SeeJohnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918-22 (1997).
149 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
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uniquely federal interests,"'" 50 but any such statement seems to re-
present more a specific application of the balancing test than a com-
prehensive formulation.
15 1
It is also worth noting, with respect to the amount of federal law
injected into the state courts, that balancing does not dictate either
intrusive or deferential results. The outcome of balancing depends
on the weights given the various recognized interests. Using balanc-
ing, one could, for example, still champion outcomes of judicial
choice of law that greatly favor state law, based on the view that (1)
courts should not be active articulators of governmental interests or
(2) our constitutional scheme supports a presumption in favor of state
interests and hence in favor of state law in state courts.15 2 Although
my discussion here focuses on methodology, and not necessarily on
outcomes, I would nonetheless argue for carrying over the interests
and their weights as worked out in the Erie setting. First, countering
the argument as to the passive role for courts, reverse-Eie is easier to
justify than Erie itself. Erie sometimes involves the creation of federal
law by the federal courts, but reverse-Erie merely has state courts de-
ciding whether existing federal law displaces state law. Although the
state courts can create state law, they cannot create federal law.153
Second, countering the argument as to the weightiness of state inter-
ests, there is no reason that state interests in state court should weigh
more heavily than federal interests do in federal court. Any presump-
tion here in favor of state law, like the presumption against preemp-
tion, is more a figure of speech than a real rule.15 4 The very existence
of the Supremacy Clause would seem to suggest as much.
55
150 Bellia, supra note 5, at 834 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); cf id. at 840-45 (discussing methodology more generally).
151 See PETER HlAY & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM 309
& n.417 (1982).
152 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 19, at 1413-19; Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federal-
ism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 88-102 (1988); Young, supra note
14, at 132. But see, e.g., Redish & Sklaver, supra note 5, at 105-08.
153 See supra text accompanying note 144. One cannot, however, turn the argu-
ment around to champion more intrusive injection of federal law into the state
courts. After all, state courts could not and would not be more active than the federal
courts in articulating federal interests.
154 See Davis, supra note 7, at 222; Dinh, supra note 32, at 2092-97; Nelson, Preemp-
tion, supra note 27, at 290-303; cf. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Con-
struction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 111 (2005)
("The malleability of these language canons, and the uncertain weight and cyclical
fashionability of certain substantive canons, should serve as a warning against unduly
ambitious claims on their behalf.").
155 Here it is possible to turn the argument around to champion more intrusive




So, the reverse-Erie balance should, 
and does, closely resemble
the Erie balance. In fact, the basic 
methodologies are the same.
Courts balance state interests, federal 
interests, and outcome differ-
ences. Yet the last of those three 
factors plays out a little differently 
in
the different settings of state court 
and federal court. Let me explain
by fleshing out the details of balancing.
To begin, an Erie-like outcome-determinative 
effect belongs on
the reverse-Eie balance, just as Felder 
unambiguously ruled.1
56 Courts
do and should yearn to avoid different 
outcomes in state and federal
court. But to be more specific about 
state court choice of law requires
another look back to Erie's progeny 
on choice of law in federal court.
effect of a federally mandated choice 
of law that might favor federal law) 
could in
theory make federal interests weigh more 
heavily than state interests. For example,
consider Norfolk & Western Railway v. 
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 498 (1980) (holding 
that,
in a state court FELA case, federal 
law required cautionary nontaxability 
instruction
to jury), discussed supra note 129. 
Although the state in Klawonn v. 
Mitchell, 475
N.E.2d 857, 861 (Ill. 1985), reaffirmed 
that a cautionary nontaxability instruction 
was
improper in a state-law wrongful-death 
case in state court, the federal appellate 
court
in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 
Illinois, 701 F.2d 1189, 1199-200 
(7th Cir.
1983), followed by In reAir Crash Disaster 
Near Chi., Ill., 803 F.2d 304, 313-16 
(7th Cir.
1986), held that the Illinois rule 
against giving such an instruction 
did not apply
under Erie in a diversity action in 
Illinois federal court for wrongful 
death, cautionary
instructions being governed by federal 
law. Thus, it would seem that Norfolk 
is more
intrusive in inflicting federal law on 
state courts than Air Crash is in applying 
state law
in federal courts.
However, in practice, I do not perceive 
that judicial choice-of-law balancing, 
in
contrast to preemption, results in 
greater intrusiveness of federal law 
in state courts,
as compared to state law applying 
in federal courts. See supra text 
accompanying
notes 134-38. To pursue the above 
example, most cases in fact hold 
the opposite of
Air Crash, and Gasperini's willingness 
to apply state law would seem to 
have strength-
ened their hand. See, e.g., Gander 
v. FMC Corp., 892 F.2d 1373, 1382 
(8th Cir. 1990);
Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 
F.2d 271, 276-78 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Coy v. Simpson
Marine Safety Equip., Inc., 787 F.2d 
19, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1986); Gerbich 
v. Evans, 525 F.
Supp. 817, 819-20 (D. Colo. 1981). 
And anyway, Norfolk and Air Crash 
are not really
converse cases. The converse of 
Norfolk would arise when the state 
law required a
cautionary instruction that the federal 
practice did not permit, in which 
case the fed-
eral court would apply state law. 
See Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health 
Plan, Inc., 876
F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying 
a state cautionary instruction in 
a diversity
case).
156 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,138, 
141,151-53 (1988). But see LINDAJ. 
SILBER-
MAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBLAS BARRINGTON 
WOLFF, TEACHER'S MANUAL, CrvIL 
PROCE-
DURE 111 (2d ed. 2006) ("Note one 
key difference between this doctrine 
and Erie- the
parties, in most cases, had the equal 
ability to bring or remove the case 
to federal
court. Thus, concerns about 'outcome 
determination' are normally misplaced; 
if ei-
ther party wanted access to federal 
procedures, they could have, in 
most cases,
brought the case there .... (citations 
omitted)).
36 I A~ LA EIWIo.8:
The Court in Hanna formulated, by extended 
dicta, a refined ver-
sion of its earlier outcome-determinative test. 
Under this refinement,
the courts should look not to mere 
differences in outcome, but only
to differences in law that would undermine 
"the twin aims of the Erie
rule: discouragement of forum-shopping 
and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws."'
157 By this phrase, as illuminated in later
cases,158 the Court apparently referred 
to the federal interest in avoid-
ing those differences between the law 
applied in the federal court and
in the forum state court (1) that would 
inflict the systemic costs of
forum-shopping between federal and 
state courts by plaintiff or defen-
dant or, much more importantly, (2) 
that would cause the unfairness
of treating similarly situated persons 
differently in a substantial way
simply because certain classes of people 
have a choice of court sys-
tems, whether the comparison is between 
plaintiff and defendant or
between party and hypothetical party 
identical in all but citizenship.
Under Erie, therefore, the federal courts 
should lean toward applying
state law when necessary to avoid differences 
that are significant in
either of those two ways.
Likewise under reverse-Eie, there is 
a federal interest in the uni-
formity of law applied in federal and 
state court. 159 As to forum-shop-
ping, there should still be some desire 
to avoid shopping by plaintiffs
or defendants between the two systems. 
As to inequitable administra-
tion of the laws, there is still an unfairness 
in that certain classes of
people have a choice of court systems. 
However, here the bigger dan-
ger is choosing among state court systems 
on matters of federal con-
cern, rather than between state and 
federal court systems, because
usually albeit not always the parties 
have equal access to federal court.
That is, the emphasis should shift somewhat 
to interstate shopping,
rather than worrying mainly about 
intrastate shopping. Federal rights
and duties should not vary from state 
to state. Any horizontal legal
differences will produce forum-shopping 
and inequitable administra-
tion in the reverse-Eie setting similar 
to the vertical dangers feared in
the Erie setting. The constant interest 
in avoiding such dangers means
that a comparable outcome-determinative 
effect should receive about
the same weight in each setting.'
60
157 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 
468 (1965).
158 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744-45 (1980).
159 See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 
477 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1986).
160 See Shaw v. Leatherberry, 706 
N.W.2d 299, 310 (Wis. 2005) (holding 
in a
§ 1983 action that the ordinary federal 
standard of proof displaces the state's 
elevated
standard of proof for police-brutality 
cases, and observing among other factors 
that
applying state law would "disrupt 
the federal interest in uniformity" 
and that "al-
lowing different burdens of proof for 
the same action, based solely on where 
the
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Note, finally, that for reverse-Erie the outcome-determinative ef-
fect (OD) should add to the other federal interests in having federal
law applied in state court (affirmative countervailing considerations,
or ACC), because applying federal law would avoid outcome-determi-
native differences among federal and state courts. In other words, the
outcome-determinative effect becomes a reason not to apply state law.
Accordingly, the formulation most analogous to an Erie balance of
[state interests versus (ACC - OD) ] is, for reverse-Erie, the balance of
[state interests versus (ACC + OD)]. 161
C. Interrelating the Doctrines
Return the focus to the whole subject of applicable federal and
state law in state court, including both preemption and judicial choice
of law. The foregoing analysis revealed that considerable federal law
flows down to apply in state courts. In areas of strong federal concern,
such as clearly "substantive" areas of great federal interest, federal law
applies in state court, sometimes even by direct constitutional com-
mand. As one moves into more "procedural" areas of both federal
and state concern, the hard reverse-Erie cases arise. Finally, as one
moves into clearly "substantive" areas of great state concern, state law
more surely governs, often by constitutional necessity.
action is brought, would be discriminatory against Wisconsin plaintiffs, and would, in
effect, violate the purposes of § 1983"); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1415-20 (2006).
161 In both Erie and reverse- Erie, the formula balances the forum's interests minus
OD versus the other sovereign's interests. The two doctrines are thus symmetrical
theoretically. But the shifting side for OD could conceivably induce a circularity in
application of procedural law, with the federal court applying state law in pursuit of
conformity and the state court ironically applying federal law on the same issue in the
same pursuit of conformity. Cf Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 4, at 987 n.155 ("In a
manner quite parallel to the operation of renvoi in choice of law practice, a federal
court asserting diversity jurisdiction over a case raising federal questions (by way of
defense) should apply state law (Erie, including a fair amount of state procedure), but
the state courts must apply federal law (Dice, including a fair amount of federal proce-
dure), so the federal court imitates the state court which is imitating the federal
courts, and thereby ends up following federal law in diversity. It may be helpful to
think of this in terms of a dog chasing its own tail.").
Reassuringly, this highly unrealistic result could never occur in actuality, because
the Erie balance always must precede the reverse-Erie balance and so the state court
will know if the federal court would apply state law. That is, even in state court, the
first question is what law the federal court would apply; and if the answer is state law,
then under reverse-Erie the state court will likewise apply state law, because only state
interests persist. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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Viewed broadly in this way, the reverse-Erie subject makes sense,
and it also appears quite similar to Erie. Judge Henry Friendly, seeing
a harmonious unity, nicely expressed the symmetry:
The complementary concepts-that federal courts must follow
state decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cogniza-
ble by the states whereas state courts must follow federal decisions
on subjects within national legislative power where Congress has so
directed or the basic scheme of the Constitution demands-seem so
beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder
why a century and a half were needed to discover them, and must
wonder even more why anyone should want to shy away once the
discovery was made. We may not yet have achieved the best of all
possible worlds with respect to the relationship between state and
federal law. But the combination of Erie [with reverse-Erie] has
brought us to a far, far better one than we have ever known
before. 
162
1. Troubling Asymmetry Between Erie and Reverse-Erie
Unfortunately, the Friendly quotation misleads somewhat. The
actually prevailing scheme does not render reverse-Erie simply the mir-
ror image of Erie.
16 3
a. Intrusiveness of Reverse-Erie
The major difference is that reverse-Erie is a more intrusive doc-
trine in terms of results realized in the real world: in that middle area
between state and federal substantive law, state courts must apply fed-
eral procedural law to federally created claims more extensively than
federal courts must apply state procedural law to state-created claims.
For example, according to Brown, in the state court the Georgia plead-
ing rule had to bow to the more lenient federal practice.1 64 In the
162 HENRY J. FRIENDLY, In Praise of Erie -and of the New Federal Common Law, in
BENCHMARKS 155, 195 (1967).
163 See Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 319 (5th Cir. 1987)
("Therefore, if the 'reverse-Erie' doctrine is perfectly symmetrical, it follows that state
courts are not obligated to apply federal forum non conveniens analysis in maritime
cases. We reject this facile syllogism; drawing conclusions from metaphors is danger-
ous.... Because the Erie diversity doctrine and the 'reverse-Erie' maritime doctrine
spring from distinct principles and policies, there is no reason to expect a perfect
symmetry between them."), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
164 Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949) (holding that, in a state court
FELA case, federal law trumps the more demanding state pleading practice); see also
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (holding that, in




analogous Erie setting of a diversity case, 
a federal court would never
bow to a contrary state pleading practice
.165 There can be no doubt,
despite the debate, that upon the proper 
comparison-say, compar-
ing the whole range of applicable law 
for federal causes of action in
state court to that for state causes of 
action in federal court-reverse-
Erie is more intrusive than 
Erie."66
Perhaps one might try to ascribe any 
excessive zeal for federal law
to the fact that initially the key reverse-Erie 
cases of Brown and Dice
involved the pro-plaintiff FELA or that 
they were decided in the hey-
day of the Court's outcome-determinative 
test. However, recent cases
such as Felder, which apply federal law 
other than in favor of FELA
plaintiffs, rebut such explanatory attempts.
167 Brown and Dice today




restricted explanations fail. One must 
instead accept the generalized
explanation: federal law is more puissant 
than state law and hence
more intrusive.
Nevertheless, much state law that interferes 
with federal interests
still applies in state court. One therefore 
must confront the major
puzzlement of reverse-Erie why are federal 
interests not so potent as
to push aside all state law that gets in 
their way in state court? That is,
once federal supremacy comes into 
play, how can the dam hold
against the flood of federal law? The 
elusive explanation is that the
165 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965), discussed supra note 58; Cohen 
v.
Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292 (l1th 
Cir. 1999), vacated in part on other grounds, 
204
F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).
166 See WmcGT & KANr, supra note 
6, § 45, at 293 (concluding that the 
role for
federal law is so extensive that state 
procedure's role is "de minimis"); cf. Redish 
&
Sklaver, supra note 5, at 105-08 (arguing 
for a very intrusive reverse-Erie doctrine).
But see SILBERMAN ET AL, supra note 156, 
at 111 ("It is thus not surprising that 
the
Supreme Court has been far less protective 
of federal procedures in state courts than
it has been of state procedures in federal court."); 
cf Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 117,
at 57 (conveying only a part of reverse-Erie 
and so entitling its coverage as "Notes 
on
the Occasional Duty of State Courts 
to Apply Federal Procedures").
167 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 
138, 151 (1988); see also, e.g., Gulf Offshore
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 
484-88 (1981) (applying reverse-Erie 
in a state
court Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
case), remanded to 628 S.W.2d 171, 174 
(Tex.
App. 1982) (deciding that Congress had 
settled the choice-of-law question); Norfolk
& W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 498 
(1980) (applying pro-defendant rule in 
a state
court FELA case).
168 This principle does not mean, however, 
that Dicdsjury holding applies across
the board, because choice of law would 
take into account the federal substantive 
set-
ting. Nor does it mean that Brown's 
pleading holding applies across the board, 
be-
cause choice of law would take into account 
the state's particular rule in question. 
It
means only that today the intrusion of 
Brown and Dice applies beyond the FELA 
and
particular state rules.
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intrusiveness of federal law comes through a sluice gate, located at the
preemption side of reverse-Erie rather than on its judicial balancing
side.
b. Preemption
The explanation for the discrepancy between the reaches of fed-
eral and state laws under reverse-Erie and Erie is that the Supremacy
Clause plays a nonobvious role through the preemption doctrine.
Conflict preemption works in favor of federal law by rejecting not only
any state law that openly discriminates against or contradicts federal
law but also any state law that otherwise imposes unnecessary burdens
upon federal rights, as in the two examples of Brown and Dice, which
lie just within the outer boundary of conflict preemption.169 Preemp-
tion so acts regardless of the outcome of any balancing methodology.
Accordingly, federal law spills down into state court much more than
state law applies in federal court, but only where conflict preemption
reigns.
The preemptive federal law might be constitutional, statutory, or
common law. For one example, federal defenses to state-law claims,
like qualified immunity, should apply much more commonly in state
court than do state defenses to federal-law claims in federal court.' 70
So too should federal procedural law spill down more easily than state
procedural law flows up. 71 Or, to return to that Brown example and
at last explain it, the state's anti-plaintiff pleading rule fell because the
Court saw it as directly colliding in that case with the pro-plaintiff
FELA. 172 The result was a preemption that rejected any state interests.
In the converse-Brown setting, when the question would be whether a
state's pro-plaintiff pleading rule applies in a diversity case, the Erie
balance manages to tilt in favor of the federal pleading law. That is,
federal procedural interests overcome the interests in favor of apply-
ing state law, even to the extent of establishing Hanna's blanket ap-
proach for the Federal Rules. 173 In Brown the Supremacy Clause
169 See DRAiHozAL, supra note 15, at 84-86, 102-05, 112; Hill, supra note 5, at 387,
390, 405, 414-15.
170 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
171 See DRAiqozAL, supra note 15, at 84-86.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 102-04 and notes 164-68 and accompany-
ing text; see also 111. Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Price, 539 So. 2d 202, 205-06 (Ala. 1988) (rul-
ing that the content of FED. R. Cfv. P. 25(a) governs under FELA). This holding is
supported by the fact that there is no equivalent of Hanna for blanket protection of
state procedural rules from preemption.
173 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965).
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causes federal procedure to preempt state procedure,174 but in con-
verse-Brown the Supremacy Clause obviously plays no comparable role
to cause the state sovereign's law to trump any conflicting rules of the
home court.
c. Judicial Choice of Law
Now consider reverse-Erie as the situation moves from direct colli-
sions between state and federal laws, to obstacle preemption and
other situations where it really is the court determining the extent of
the federal law. Then, although preemption terminology might re-
main in play, reverse-Erie's balancing methodology is phasing in and
taking over in reality. In this zone, where one encounters cases like
Felder and Johnson just inside the border of judicial choice of law, 175
the court performs a more truly independent role through balancing.
Because of the similarity of their balancing methodologies, re-
verse-Erie and Erie look much more alike here. Indeed, as developed
in a previous section, neither theory nor practice suggests that much
of a discrepancy in results exists. 1 7 There is no need, just in order to
explain the greater intrusiveness of federal law, for the judicial choice-
of-law balances to favor federal law or otherwise to become asymmetri-
cal as between reverse-Eie and Erie. The operation of preemption by
itself adequately explains that greater intrusiveness.
2. Troubling Symmetry Between Erie and Reverse-Eie
The relative intrusiveness of reverse-Erie, caused by locating con-
flict preemption (as in Brown and Dice) next to normal judicial balanc-
174 Cf Brown, 338 U.S. at 296 ("[A] federal right cannot be defeated by the forms
of local practice.").
175 See Dinh, supra note 32, at 2103-05. Compare Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138
(1988) (displacing the state's notice-of-claim statute for a federal civil rights case in
state court), withJohnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922-23 (1997) (refusing to dis-
place the state's appealability doctrine for a federal civil rights case in state court).
Felder is a difficult read. See Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State
Courts, 54 BRooK. L. REv. 1057, 1066-70, 1093-94 (1989). Some commentators criti-
cize Felder as going beyond the conflict-preemption precedents, but such criticism
fails to consider the case as a proper exercise of the judicial choice-of-law function.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 74, at 450, 461-62. Although the state's notice-of-
claim statute did not conflict with the federal civil rights statute, there were strong
federal interests in favor of applying federal law in state court. Johnson, on the other
hand, provides an example of state procedural law applying in state court, while fed-
eral procedural law would apply on the same point in federal court.
176 See supra Part I.B.3.
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ing (as in Felder and Johnson), necessitated the foregoing discursion.
But in absolute terms, how much more intrusive is it than Erie?
a. Similarity of the Doctrines
When all is said and done, the extent of the extra intrusion of
federal law into state courts, as compared to the intrusion of state law
into federal courts, is rather limited.177 Reverse-Erie certainly does not
wholly displace state procedure.178 Generally, "federal law takes the
state courts as it finds them."'179 Moreover, the extra intrusion is not
at all discombobulating theoretically. To say that conflict preemption
can sometimes be intrusive is merely to observe that the Supremacy
Clause resolves conflicts between the sovereigns' laws in the federal
law's favor. Conflicting state law will fall, because no argument of
countervailing state interests can prevail. Thus, the reverse-Eie and
Erie doctrines are in fact not terribly disproportionate or ill-meshing.
So minimizing the discontinuities ironically raises the opposite
challenge of justifying the use in the reverse-Erie situation of method-
ologies that are very similar to Erie's approach. Indeed, it is not the
asymmetry that disturbs many observers, it is this remaining symmetry.
They think that the role of the Supremacy Clause in reverse-Erie
177 See 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 125, § 4023, at 358 ("There is no apparent
formula to capture and define the decisions. At the same time, there is little reason to
suppose wholesale rejection of state procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will not become binding on state courts when they undertake to enforce federal
rights. The intrusions of federal procedure, although difficult to predict in detail, will
not be that pervasive."); Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1182-83; cf. Jackson, supra note 5,
at 133 ("It may be that lawyers' learning that 'you take the state courts as you find
them,' for the purposes of adjudicating federal claims, is, notwithstanding important
exceptions, so well established, that it does not occur to lawyers who have chosen to
litigate in state courts to seek the use of federal procedures. I am not aware of recent
evidence of a substantial problem of state court procedures (as compared to those in
federal courts) systematically interfering with the enforcement of federal rights.
(footnotes omitted)).
178 Wholesale displacement would be constitutionally troubling, see Hill, supra
note 5, at 413; supra note 14, but reverse-Erie stops well short of violating any anti-
commandeering or similar federalism principle that may exist as to state courts. Com-
pare Bellia, supra note 16, at 970-92 (examining limits imposed by federalism in state-
law cases), with Redish & Sklaver, supra note 5, at 75-90 (examining broad federal
power to commandeer state courts from historical, textual, and political
perspectives).
179 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 489, 508 (1954).
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should produce a very different doctrine from Erie.180 Why should
reverse-Erie resemble Erie at all?
Basically, Eie-like methodologies apply to reverse-Eie because,
despite the underlying principle of federal supremacy, the same no-
tion of cooperative federalism applies in both situations, calling for
comity when one sovereign is enforcing the other's law. The problem
is the same. The only reason the reaches of state and federal laws, in
the converse settings, differ at all is that the underlying principle of
federal supremacy tilts the playing field for competing state and fed-
eral interests. Whenever state law and federal law directly collide, pre-
emption applies. The contest is over. Federal law there reigns
supreme.
b. Feedback Between the Doctrines
Erie ideas thus help to make sense of reverse-Erie. In state court,
the balancing methodology smooths, while it explains, the outer
reaches of preemption. On the one hand, in the setting that involves
a matter more of inference by judge than of implication by statute,
when state law would merely frustrate federal law, those Erie ideas pro-
vide refinement of how obstacle and field preemption should work:
whenever federal interests outweigh state interests in an Erie sense,
there should be preemption. On the other hand, as one goes even
farther into more independent judicial choice of law under reverse-
Erie, the direct application of Erie ideas becomes easier and easier to
justify. There is, consequently, no real problem in adding Erie ideas to
preemption in this setting.
Conversely, there is no real problem with injecting preemption
ideas into traditional Erie theory. A few commentators acknowledge
the obvious fact that preemption analysis constitutes part of the Erie
doctrine in federal court too.18 1 Direct collisions between pertinent
federal law and state law will result in preemption of the state law in
federal court. In fact, Erie's judicial choice-of-law methodology actu-
ally works only as a backup to preemption. Consider Hanna as an
example. Its analysis is reassuringly similar to the reverse-Erie scheme.
The initial Hanna question is whether the state law directly collides
180 See, e.g., SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 156, at 111 ("Some teachers find objec-
tionable the phrase 'reverse Erie,' as the doctrine has little to do with the federalism
concerns animating Erie and its progeny. Rather, the doctrine is a corollary of the
Supremacy Clause: it is sometimes necessary to force state courts to adopt federal
procedures in order to give effect to a federal substantive right.").
181 See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Com-
mon Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 751, 774 (1998)
(stressing that students cannot understand Erie without also studying preemption).
2oo6]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
with a Federal Rule: if so, the Federal Rule governs; if not, the judicial
choice-of-law methodology steps in as a backup.'l8 That is to say, in
both the Hanna and the reverse-Erie settings, in federal court and
state court respectively, a direct collision of federal and state law effec-
tively results in preemption of the state law, but otherwise an accom-
modation of federal and state interests is necessary to determine
applicable law.
The bottom line is that reverse-Erie and Erie each entail the same
methodology of preemption as well as the same methodology of judi-
cial choice of law. Their dual methodologies are the same, even if the
resulting reaches offederal and state laws differ because of the asymmetri-
cal effect of the Supremacy Clause in the operation of the preemption
doctrine. Assuming that the Constitution, Congress, or binding pre-
cedent has not explicitly foreclosed the question of applicable law, the
federal court and the state court alike must determine if federal law
preempts state law. Outside the reach of preemption, the federal
court and the state court alike must make a choice of law in light of
competing federal and state interests.
3. Soothing Summary of Erie and Reverse-Erie
This, then, is the reverse-Erie doctrine: federal law-be it constitu-
tional, statutory, or common law-will apply pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause in state court, subject to the Constitution or Con-
gress having already chosen the applicable law, whenever it preempts
state law or whenever it prevails by an Erie-like judicial choice of law.
This summary is not some wishfully radical proposal. Instead, its
aim is an accurate statement of the current law. If the state and fed-
eral laws directly collide, then the federal law preempts; if not, and
only if not, then the state courts must perform the federally mandated
accommodation of interests to choose the applicable law. That is, pre-
emption and judicial choice of law are alternative routes to the
supremacy of federal law, not alternative routes to the application of
state law. If federal law applies, say, by express preemption, the courts
are not to second-guess the congressional dictate by some sort ofjudi-
cial balancing. Only in the realm beyond preemption does judicial
choice of law have an independent role. In the middle zone of obsta-
cle and field preemption, the accommodation of federal and state in-
terests helps to concretize preemption: recall that whenever federal
182 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. for Hu-
manities, Inc., 518 U.S, 415, 437 n.22 (1996) (applying state law), with id. at 468




interests overcome state interests in an Erie sense, there should be
such preemption. A benefit of this insight is to alleviate the difficulty
of preemption's obscure bounds. The increasing attention to accom-
modation of federal and state interests in that middle zone moots the
precise location of the outer boundary of preemption, as that bound-
ary becomes an imperceptibly transitional zone in the middle of the
broad subject of reverse-Erie.
Once preemption and judicial choice of law thus find their adja-
cent places, the reverse-Erie and Erie doctrines become amenable to
productive comparison. Both doctrines involve determining the ap-
propriate reach of state and federal laws. For each institutional
player, answering any such hitherto undecided choice-of-law question
should entail a consciousness of federal supremacy but often also
some sort of accommodation of interests. Thus, the two doctrines
share a basic similarity. They deserve to be studied together. They
should generate comparable intensities of debate, although they have
not.
Upon study, the Erie and reverse-Erie doctrines ultimately form a
logical and arguably optimal pattern, just as Judge Friendly sug-
gested,1 83 with state law applying throughout our system where it
ought to apply and with federal law applying where it should apply to
federal and state players. To summarize the big picture of our legal
system, in areas of clear state "substantive" concern, state law governs
in both state and federal courts. As one moves into "procedural" ar-
eas, state law tends to govern in state court and federal law tends to
govern in federal court, but not always. Finally, as one moves into
areas of clear federal "substantive" concern, federal law governs in
both state and federal courts. The patterns of answers from Erie and
reverse-Erie are not all that different, and both dissimilarities and simi-
larities are explicable and instructive.
Reverse-Erie, including preemption and judicial choice of law,
and Erie, including federal common law and other subdoctrines, in
fact turn out to be facets of the same problem. Resolving this over-
arching problem of the relationship between state and federal law re-
quires a simultaneous consideration of the implications of these two
interlocking doctrines, a complicated process that nicely reflects the
complications of federalism itself.
183 See supra text accompanying note 162.
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II. SIGNIFICANCE
A. Signficance to the Country
The foregoing few pages' summary of the big picture rightly im-
plies that the subject here is extraordinarily important, But it was a
long road to that brief summary. Accordingly, the importance of re-
verse-Erie, and sometimes even of Erie itself, is initially a bit mysterious
to people.
Additionally, most of the major Erie cases involve only a judicial
application of quasi-procedural state law in federal diversity cases.
184
Consequently, some people seem to view this subject as technical or
simply arcane. Others have characterized this view thus:
Erie has no meaning for cases outside diversity jurisdiction. Erie re-
flects the principle that the federal courts have an obligation to ap-
ply state law whenever their sole reason for hearing a dispute is to
provide a fair and impartial forum. Accordingly, the rule in Erie is
confined to diversity cases, where the only federal interest is in pro-
viding a forum free of interstate bias, and perhaps to certain ancil-
lary and pendent claims, which the federal courts have no
independent interest in resolving and which are heard solely be-
cause of their connection with federal claims.
185
Such a view could not be more wrong. Those leading cases are the tail
of a humongous dog. We study mainly those tough major cases be-
cause they arose where the battle was waged-the difficult quasi-pro-
cedural issues in diversity when the higher lawmakers have been
silent-but the rationale of those cases controls in the infinitude of
more obvious cases.
Therefore, the same choice-of-law problem arises not only in di-
versity cases but in all other federal cases, as represented by the bot-
tom row of my figure below. It also arises in all state cases. This
commonality is what this Article was about, and it explains how I could
say that reverse-Erie and Erie are facets of the same problem.
But that encapsulation makes vertical choice of law sound like a
problem only for the judiciary. Instead, it arises in all matters of law-
making faced by the legislature and the executive, as well as by their
administrative agencies, as the next row of my figure tries to re-
present. Indeed, this problem was the main concern of the Framers
184 See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 535 (1949);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
185 Peter Westen &Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diver-
sity?, 78 MicH. L. REv. 311, 313 & n.9 (1980) (citing various sources as "representative
statements" of this view).
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in their task of creating a federal system by the Constitution, which is
after all a choice-of-law document. The government still performs this
task of allocating between state and federal law in its ordinary making
of law. If the Constitution made the choice between state and federal
law, its choice is binding. If it did not choose, then Congress, subject
to existing constitutional constraints, can make the binding choice.
Only if the Constitution and Congress (and its authorized delegates)
have not chosen, then the federal and state courts, as junior partners
in this endeavor, get to make the choice, acting by a judicially devel-
oped choice-of-law methodology that today operates well inside the
outer constitutional constraints and so can reflect the optimal rela-
tionship of state and federal law.
In turn, that description makes vertical choice of law sound like
solely a lawmaking problem of the government. Instead, our legal sys-
tem imposes on all officials-and indeed on all persons living under it
and trying to apply the law, whether as lawyers or as other citizens-
the problem of divining whether the government allocated a matter
2006]
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to state or federal law. So, these law-applying actors too must appear
in any figure representing the whole picture of reverse-Erie and Erie.
In sum, the simple fact is that every question of law posed to every
actor in a federal system such as ours is preceded by the choice-of-law
problem of whether the legal question is a matter of state or federal
law. "Every question of law" means all tasks of making or applying law
by every actor. "Every actor" means all public or private institutions
and persons-the private person in private affairs, the policeman on
the beat, the judge, the rulemaker, the legislator, the Framer. They
all must precede every legal decision or act with a choice-of-law pro-
cess, that is, by first deciding whether federal or state law should gov-
ern. If a car driver or a police officer is trying to determine the speed
limit, that law-applier needs first to resolve whether state or federal
law governs by determining the choice that the Constitution, Con-
gress, or courts have made or would make. Most often, in fact almost
always, the choice-of-law problem is very easy in light of a gross imbal-
ance of competing interests, and so it has an intuitively clear answer.
Rarely, closer to the dividing line between state and federal law, the
resolution can be exquisitely difficult. The same goes for lawmakers,
although here too somebody higher in the hierarchy probably has al-
ready made the choice. Of course, the same goes for courts when
applying or making law, although the difficult cases will be much
more numerous and prominent for thei, as demonstrated by their
endless attention to the Erie doctrine over the years. In all events, the
choice-of-law problem is literally ubiquitous: the first step in any legal
act in our federal system is a vertical choice of law. 18
6
186 This problem of choosing between state and federal law appears to be inherent
in any of the many federal systems. Because federalism involves the people living
under the authority of more than one sovereign, such choice of law is inevitable. See
Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. Rvv. 1, 49-59 (2002) (dis-
cussingJustice Kennedy's metaphor of federalism's splitting the atom of sovereignty);
cf David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1697, 1724-26 (2003) (extending the focus to
looser confederacies). Some interesting work on comparative federalism exists, such
as the work exploring the lessons that U.S. federalism may hold for the European
Union, despite the daunting difficulty of comparing at such a complexly fundamental
level. See, e.g., LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001); Larry Catd Backer, The Extra-Na-
tional State: American Confederate Federalism and the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
173 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union:
Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L, REv. 1612 (2002); cf
Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems,
90 VA. L. REv. 731, 817-27 (2004) (stressing instead the lessons of European federal-
ism for the United States); Symposium, Federalism in the Americas... and Beyond (pts. I




Parenthetically, the way all these lawmakers 
and appliers should
make this choice is, in my own view, not 
by some bizarrely cramped
test such as the bare "twin-aims test" that 
some see in Hanna,
18 7 but by
a broad balancing of state interests versus 
federal interests (including
outcome-determinativeness) .188 Balancing 
is how the Framers de-
cided to add the Seventh Amendment,
189 that is how Congress en-
acted Federal Rule of Evidence 501,190 
that is how the rulemakers
adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c), 191 that is how the
Court decided Byrd'
92 and GasperiniY
93 It is also how they have de-
cided substantive matters. When the 
Constitution authorized our cur-
rency system,'
94 when Congress determined the reach 
of the securities
law,' 95 or when the Court 
decided matters of intrastate 
waters,
9 6 it
balanced state and federal interests. Some 
sort of balancing, on ques-
outside Europe). See generally FEDERAL SYSTEMS 
OF THE WORLD (Daniel J. Elazar ed.,
2d ed. 1994) (considering federalism 
globally); RONALD J. WATTS, COMPARING 
FED-
ERAL SYSTEMS (2d ed. 1999) (same); Centro 
Studi sul Federalismo, BIBLIOGPAPHISA
BULLETIN ON FEDERALISM (Italy), http://www.csfederalismo.it/User/index-en.html
(follow Bulletin hyperlink) (same).
But scholars have given little or no attention 
to the lessons that the Erie megadoc-
trine holds for foreign federal systems, 
even though it embodies the ultimate 
mecha-
nism for actually implementing federalism. 
The main reason for so ignoring Erie 
is
that the comparative federalism work 
has proceeded from a constitutional law 
or po-
litical science perspective, which perspectives 
have long ignored Erie by leaving it to
civil procedure and federal courts scholars. 
The inattention is probably also owing 
to
the facts, first, that parallel hierarchies 
of state and federal courts, which would 
make
Erie's relevance obvious, are not the norm 
elsewhere and, second, that foreign courts
have not yet theorized their problem 
as one of vertical choice of law or realized 
that
the problem is literally ubiquitous within 
any federal system. In particular, because
the European Union lacks lower "federal" 
courts, traditional Erie doctrine seems 
irrel-
evant at first glance; but reverse-Erie should 
eventually prove instructive as the authori-
ties continue to struggle with the choice 
between E.U. law and national law, especially
on quasi-procedural issues such as time 
limits on which the national procedural 
law
would tend to undercut E.U. substantive 
law. See KOEN LENAERTS, DiR.I ARTS & 
IGlACE
MASELIS, PROCEDURAL LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 83-85, 92-94 (2d 
ed. 2006).
187 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 58, at 707-18. 
Among its many shortcomings, the 
twin-
aims Erie test provides no handle 
on how to answer a reverse-Erie 
question.
188 See Lipkin, supra note 56, at 97, 
164-65 (describing "federalism as balance,"
and arguing for its specification).
189 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
190 FED. R. EVID. 501.
191 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
192 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
193 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-28 (1996).
194 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
195 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000).
196 E.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata 
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tions of first impression, represents the path 
to the solution of this
fundamental and universal threshold question 
of federalism.
Whether or not the reader agrees as to all methodological 
details,
we should by now be in agreement that 
the subject under study is far
from technical or arcane: it is the key 
to understanding federalism
and hence our governmental and 
legal system. A megadoctrine,
which shares the Erie name, treats this 
ubiquitous and profound issue
of the division between state and federal 
domains. Reverse-Erie inter-
locks with the Erie case and ultimately 
merges into the overall Erie
megadoctrine to form a logical and 
arguably optimal pattern.
B. Insignificance in the Curriculum
1. Civil Procedure Courses
No doubt about it, the federalizing 
revolution in the content of
civil procedure courses
1 97 is complete on the Erie front. All eighteen
current civil procedure casebooks cover 
Erie, devoting an average of
sixty-three pages to it, although their 
coverage does vary from single
to triple digits.
198
197 See Mary Brigid McManamon, 
The History of the Civil Procedure Course: 
A Study in
Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARz. ST. 
L.J. 397, 435-36 (1998).
198 The coverage of applicable law 
in federal and state court is as follows: 
BARBARA
ALLEN BABCOCK, TONI M. MASSARO 
& NORMAN W. SPAULDING, CIVIL PROCEDURE
789-826 (3d ed. 2006); JOHN T. CROSS, 
LESLIE W. ABRAMSON & ELLEN E. DEASON,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 319-33, 849-96 (2006); 
DAVID CRUMP, WILLIAM V. DORSANEO, 
III &
REX R. PERSCHBACHER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 
189-224 (4th ed.
2001); FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, 
at 324-93; OWEN M. FIss &JUDITH RESNIK, 
ADJUDI-
CATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
1079-97 (2003); RICHARD D. FREER & 
WENDY COLLINS
PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 587-650 
(4th ed. 2005); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, 
ARTHUR R.
MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN 
HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
361-449 (9th ed.
2005); JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, JONATHAN 
M. LANDERS & MICHAEL G. COLLINS, 
THE LAW
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 259-302 (2d ed. 2006); 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,JR., COLIN C. TAIT,
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER & STEPHEN 
McG. BUNDY, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE 449-545 (9th ed. 
2005); ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER 
N. MAY, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 441-527 (2d ed. 2006); 
A. LEO LEVIN, PHILIP SHUCHMAN & 
CHARLES M.
YABLON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
61-68 (2d ed. 2000); MARCUS ET 
AL., supra note 3, at
919-1016; JEFFREY A. PARNESS, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE FOR FEDERAL AND 
STATE COURTS
309-38 (2001); THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., 
SUZANNA SHERRY &JAY TIDMARSH, 
CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 570-622 (2004); LINDA J. SILBERMAN, 
ALLAN R. STEIN & ToBIAS BARRINGTON
WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 459-573 
(2d ed. 2006); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA 
L. MI-
NOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS 
0. MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 723-63 (2d 
ed. 2004);
LARRY L. TEPLY, RALPH U. WHITTEN 
& DENIS F. MCLAUGHLIN, CASES, TEXT, 
AND
PROBLEMS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 
424-544 (2d ed. 2002); STEPHEN C. 
YEAzELL, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 221-53 (6th ed. 2004).
The civil procedure casebooks' coverage 
of Erie is analyzed by RobertJ. Condlin,
"A Formstone of Our Federalism": The Erie/Hanna 
Doctrine & Casebook Law Reform, 59 U.
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In stark contrast, their express and thematic coverage of reverse-
Erie is minimal. Seven casebooks do not really touch the doctrine.
Three others just mention it very briefly, not getting past the rule that
state courts might have to follow some federal procedure when hear-
ing federal-law claims. 99 Three more casebooks go beyond bare men-
tion to treat the doctrine lightly, mostly limiting their coverage to that
same rule.2
00
Only the remaining five of the eighteen civil procedure
casebooks treat reverse-Erie at all seriously. Nevertheless, each of
these covers the subject in under ten pages.
201
Mt-s L. Riv. 475 (2005), albeit with the odd purpose of criticizing them for their
failing to adopt what he sees as the obviously right view of the Erie methodology and
their going off instead for many pages in the wrong direction. Cf. Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a
Halfvay Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REx'. 963,
1015-16 (1998) (attributing the debate over Erie, with tongue partway in cheek, to
desires to inflict a law-school "rite of passage" on students and to get tenure, with the
effect of "misleading the courts and confusing our students"). I review the casebooks'
coverage of the topic of reverse-Erie, not to show that they disagree with my view, but
to demonstrate instead that the casebooks largely ignore the topic.
Incidentally, when civil procedure casebooks mention or treat reverse-Erie in a
thematic way, they do so always as part of their Erie coverage, usually as a comparative
note toward the end. So the pages given above for Erie coverage include any reverse-
Erie coverage.
199 FREER & PERoUE, supra note 198, at 650 ("State courts must follow federal pro-
cedures 'essential to effectuate' the purposes behind the federal law." (quoting Dice
v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952)); ROWE ET AL., Supra
note 198, at 615 ("To put the point more broadly if not with high precision, state
procedure can govern so long as it does not unduly burden the federal right-but if it
does, state courts hearing federal-law claims must follow federal procedure." (citing
Dice)); SULERMAN ET AL., supra note 198, at 572-73 (discussing Felder after observing
that "there are occasions when use of state procedure does not adequately vindicate
the federal right").
200 FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 198, at 287-89 (describing Dice, Felder, and Johnson
before concluding that "It] he combination of these three cases suggests that where a
state procedural rule neither burdens nor frustrates the attainment of the federal
statute's policies and objectives, and is not outcome determinative, the plaintiff who
chooses to enforce her federal claim in state court takes the state courts as she finds
them"); IDES & MAY, supra note 198, at 442, 522-25 (describing Dice and Felder after
saying that reverse-Erie analysis is much simplified compared to Erie because "[ i f state
procedural law actually conflicts with applicable and valid federal law, the state law
must give way"); PMA.NZss, supra note 198, at 337-38 (using the release-of-claim part of
Dice as a teaching case, and not reaching the "state procedures" problem).
201 FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, at 387-93 (using Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Dice, Brown; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt,
444 U.S. 490 (1980); and Felderas teaching cases); FRIDENT-HAL ET AL., supra note 198,
at 443-49 (using Dice); I-LzM ET AL., supra note 198, at 522-28 (using Dice); MARcus
ET AL., supra note 3, at 997-1005 (using Dice); TEPLY ET AL., supra note 198, at 536-44
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It seems as if Erie and reverse-Erie should be either both in or
both out of any civil procedure course. We teachers are not looking at
Eriejust to see how to litigate in federal courts or how the federal side
of the system works. The aim today is to introduce the students to the
system of federalism, which includes two sides of a complex federal-
state relationship. 202 Therefore, I would think that the modern civil
procedure course should cover both Erie and reverse-Erie.
2. Federal Courts Courses
Nonetheless, most civil procedure casebooks are willing to leave
reverse-Eie to the federal courts course.20 3 Unfortunately, most fed-
eral courts casebooks turn out not to view that doctrine as a real con-
cern. Again, all eight current federal courts casebooks cover Erie,
treating it in greater depth by devoting about twice as many pages as
do civil procedure casebooks. 20 4 But one cannot rely on federal
courts casebooks to treat reverse-Erie with any seriousness.
Why not? Most of the federal courts casebooks naturally aim
their focus on federal courts and hence not on state courts, which is
consistent with the national law schools' usual ignoring of state courts,
(using Johnson). Representatively, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E.
SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 98 (9th ed. 2005), remarks: "Although some might consider this topic to be
outside the first-year curriculum, we find it important to include some discussion of
Dice and the Supremacy Clause concerns that this subject raises."
202 See Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating Transnational Perspectives into Civil Procedure:
1What Not to Teach, 56J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 5-7, on file
with the Notre Dame Law Review) (discussing pedagogic purposes of the first-year
course).
203 See THOMAS D. RowE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, TEACHER'S MAN-
UAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 261 (2004) ("Best to leave any detailed examination of this
question to a more advanced course on Federal Courts.").
204 The coverage of applicable law in federal court is as follows: ROnERT N. CLIN-
TON, RICHARD A. MATASAR & MICHAEL G. COLLINS, FEDERAL COURTS 697-814 (1996);
DONALD L. DOERNBERG, C. KEITH WINGATE & DONALD H. ZEIGLER, FEDERAL COURTS,
FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 329-455 (3d ed, 2004); HOWARD P. FINK,
LINDA S. MULLENIX, TH-OMAS D. RowE, JR. & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL COURTS IN
T4E 21ST CENTURY 481-547 (2d ed. 2002); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 74, at
601-825; ARTHUR D. HELLMAN & LAUREN K. ROBEL, FEDERAL COURTS 465-681 (2005);
Low & JEmEs, supra note 117, at 2-32, 124-234; MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA
SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS 866-953 (5th ed. 2002); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JOHN B.
OAKLEY, FEDERAL COURTS 740-858 (11th ed. 2005).
Incidentally, when federal courts casebooks mention or treat reverse-Erie, they
usually do not do so as part of their Erie coverage. So the pages given above for Erie
coverage do not include any real reverse-Erie coverage.
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but which would be hard to explain if the books were seeking to re-
lieve the students' ignorance of federalism. A closer look at the
books' structures suggests that they, perhaps assuming that civil proce-
dure and constitutional law courses have provided an adequate intro-
duction to the federal-state relationship, have other fish to fry. The
books' sketchy coverage of reverse-Erie typically comes not as part of
their Erie treatment but instead as part of their treatment of congres-
sional power to control the courts. Specifically, reverse-Erie appears as
an addendum to the doctrine of Testa205 and Howlett,20 6 which deals
with the states' duty to entertain federal causes of action in the ab-
sence of a valid excuse. 207 Moreover, all the books skip preemption in
the main, leaving it to constitutional law courses. This pattern in the
books' coverage suggests that reverse-Erie is sneaking in as an attenu-
ated aspect of separation of powers, rather than as a prominent fea-
ture of federalism.208
Consequently, three of the federal courts casebooks do not even
touch the topic of reverse-Erie, except implicitly through brief treat-
ment of the Testa-Howlett doctrine.20 9 Four of the remaining five do
give actual attention to the reverse-Erie topic while maintaining a pri-
mary focus on Testa-Howlett, and some of them also give additional
mention to reverse-Erie where it arises incidentally in particular topics
such as civil rights actions or adequate state grounds.210
205 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
206 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
207 Several commentators also approach reverse-Erie from the Testa-Howlett pre-
mise. See, e.g., DRAHOZAL, supra note 15, at 81-86. But cf. 16B WRIcHT ET AL., supra
note 125, § 4023 (exhibiting another but more complicated perspective, which entails
approaching the subject from the vantage of the adequate-and-independent-state-
grounds limitation on Supreme Court review); Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1137-45
(same).
I myself find the more logical and less difficult way to view Testa-Howlett and re-
verse-Erie is in the opposite order, with the Testa-Howlett cases coming later as an as-
pect of the reverse-Erie preemption and judicial choice-of-law scheme that specifically
regards the governing law on issues of access to state court. See Jackson, supra note 5,
at 113-14.
208 See Mary Brigid McManamon, Challenging the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 27
CONN. L. REV. 833 (1995) (book review) (discussing purposes of federal courts
casebooks).
209 DOERNBERG ET AL., supra note 204, at 172, 582; FINK ET AL., supra note 204, at
243-51; WRIGHT & OAKLEY, supra note 204, at 483-91.
210 CLIN-rON ET AL., supra note 204, at 277-95, 901-06, 1385; HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 74, at 443-65, 564-65, 764-65; HELLMAN & ROBEL, supra note 204, at
195-222; REDisH & SHERRY, supra note 204, at 287-301, 983. Indeed, their actual
coverage of reverse-Erie, stricto sensu separate from Howlett-Testa, is not much lengthier
than that of the thorough civil procedure books. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 204, at
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Only one federal courts casebook, it 
being the only one that in-
cludes the word "state" in its title, tries 
to integrate reverse-Erie with its
Erie coverage. It does so in the book's 
opening chapter, which is enti-
tled "Choice of Law in the 
Federal System."
21'
C. Explaining the Misperceptions
Even the relevant treatises slight the 
subject of reverse-Erie, for
similar reasons.
212 Most commentators see this subject 
as a relatively
293-95; HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 74, at 453-65 (using Dice 
as a teaching case);
HELLMAN & ROBEL, supra note 204, 
at 208-22 (using Johnson); REDISH 
& SHERRY, supra
note 204, at 294-301 (using Dice).
211 Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 117, 
at 32-65 (including coverage of reverse-Erie,
id. at 52-65 (using Johnson as a teaching 
case)). It is interesting to note that 
this book
originally appended reverse-Erie to 
Testa in a chapter on "Constitutional 
Limits on
Congressional Allocation of Jurisdiction," 
just as other federal courts books do. 
PETER
W. Low &JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, 
JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 248-63 (1987) (using Dice 
as a teaching case). While this book's 
evolution
is desirable in my view, the book's origin 
may explain its narrow view of reverse-Erie's
reach. See Low &JEFFRIES, supra note 
117, at 57 (entitling its coverage as "Notes 
on
the Occasional Duty of State Courts 
to Apply Federal Procedures").
212 The federal courts treatises slight 
the subject, although they certainly 
do not
speak with one voice while doing so. 
CHEMERNSK¢, supra note 13, § 3.5 (giving 
good
attention to Testa-Howlett in section 
entitled "Congressional Power to Have 
State
Courts Decide Federal Law Matters," 
but only slightly more than a page to 
reverse-Erie
before concluding that federal law has 
a small role whereby state courts must 
follow
federal procedures "if Congress specifies 
the procedure for a particular matter" 
or "if
the application of state procedures would 
be 'outcome determinative' or significantly
'burden the exercise of federal rights'"); 
17A LINDA S. MULLENIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE §§ 120.30, .62 (3d ed. 2006) 
(addressing applicability of federal law 
in state
court briefly before concluding 
that federal law supplants state 
procedural law only
when the latter would "effectively 
deny substantial rights under federal 
law"); LINDA
MULLENIX, MARTIN REDISH & GEORGENE VAIRO, 
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS 
AND
JURIsDICTION § 15.25 (1998) (same, 
being adapted from MOORE's FEDERAL 
PRACTICE);
PFANDER, supra note 134, § 6.5 
(saying in brief section entitled 
"The Converse-Erie
Problem" that the Supreme Court 
has provided little guidance but that 
the problem is
very similar to the Erie problem itself); 
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
(2d
ed. 1990) (not treating reverse-Erie); 
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, § 45 (giving 
good
attention to Testa-Howlett in section 
entitled "State Enforcement of Federal 
Law," but
only two pages to reverse-Erie despite 
concluding such an extensive role for 
federal
law that state procedure's role becomes 
"de minimis"); id. § 107 (also mentioning
Brown in relation to adequate-state-grounds 
doctrine); 16B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
125, § 4023, at 344, 358 (recounting 
many instances of federal law imposed 
on state
courts in section entitled "Independent 
and Adequate State Ground-Procedural
Grounds-The Independence of State 
Procedure," but resisting analogy to 
Erie be-
cause the purposes of federal jurisdiction 
to enforce state fights "need not be 
the
same as the purposes of permitting 
and often requiring state courts 
to enforce federal
rights" and thus leaving the subject as 
"a confused picture"); LARRY W. YACyLE, 
FED-
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unimportant appendage to preemption or some other doctrine, an
appendage that in the end requires little application of nonsubstan-
tive federal law in state court. But if a fraction of the remaining com-
mentators view reverse-Erie as a significant doctrine, if a few see it as a
more-or-less independent doctrine rather than as an appendage to
some other doctrine, if some see it as a more intrusive doctrine than
Erie while others view it as a less intrusive doctrine, then something is
wrong in the condition of commentary.
Commentators' development of any legal doctrine can be surpris-
ingly contingent. A subject may remain remarkably undeveloped if it
falls into a curricular gap. An example would be the collateral bar
rule, an important doctrine of which many lawyers and professors are
ignorant, because it is not quite civil procedure and not quite consti-
tutional law, managing only to squeeze into some remedies courses.213
ERAL COURTS 133-34 (2d ed. 2003) (concluding very briefly in section entitled "State
Court Obligation" that state procedural law applies except where it discriminates
against federal substantive law). Those federal courts scholars who slight the subject
may be taking their cue from Professor Hart, who belittled the Brown and Dice cases.
While acknowledging that state procedures could not act to "nullify" federal rights, he
maintained that state courts had to apply only the federal rules of decision "in those
respects which are important to the generality of people in everyday, pre-litigation
life." Hart, supra note 179, at 508; see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 74, at 463.
Civil procedure treatises tend to leave reverse-Erie to federal courts books by ig-
noring it completely, see, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2005); GENE R.
SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2002), or
virtually, see, e.g., RICH-ARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.8, at 504
(2006); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &JOHN LEUBSDORF, CVIL PROCE-
DURE § 2.36, at 164 (5th ed. 2001), but more thorough coverage does appear in JACK
H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.8 (4th ed.
2005) (taking relatively broad view of reverse-Erie), and TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note
117, at 518-20 (taking relatively narrow view).
Constitutional law treatises likewise tend to ignore reverse-Erie as a judicial
choice-of-law process, and so leave it to civil procedure and federal courts scholars,
see, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
(2d ed. 1997) (three volumes); CHEMERNSKY, supra note 15; RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOwAx, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (3d ed. 1999) (five volumes), but
not always, as shown by the latest rendition of 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw § 3-7, at 321 n.61; id. § 6-38, at 1275-77 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
especially the implications of Felder).
213 The collateral bar rule authorizes punishment by criminal contempt for the
violation of a court order even though that order is judicially determined to have
been improper (no matter how serious the error, even for lack of subject matter juris-
diction or constitutional violation), although this doctrine authorizes such punish-
ment only if the violator was personally bound and had an opportunity to pursue full
review of the order without incurring destruction of a significant right in question.
See generally John R.B. Palmer, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order
After Disobeying It, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 215 (2002) (explaining the collateral bar rule
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For reverse-Erie, civil procedure courses tend to leave it to federal
courts, a course whose interests actually take its coverage off in a dif-
ferent direction.2 14 Compounding the problem, civil procedure tends
even more predominantly to leave preemption to constitutional law, a
course that at least until recently left preemption as one of its lesser-
worked topics.
2 15
Moreover, the guise of any doctrine depends on the viewer's
point of departure from some established topic. It seems that scholars
and suggesting how lower courts should interpret existing Supreme Court
precedent).
214 A course that sometimes does a better job is conflicts. Some of its more thor-
ough casebooks not only treat Erie as a choice-of-law doctrine but reach some of Testa-
Howlett and reverse-Ei'e toward the end of the book. See, eg,, DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA
HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 760-83 (7th ed.
2006) (treating preemption and reverse-Erie together for the first time in this new
edition); GARvJ. SIMsoN, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT Or LAws 847-57 (4th
ed. 2005). But conflicts treatises do not touch on reverse-Erie and so suggest that it is
not a topic of active interest within conflicts courses. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. RICHMAN &
WILLIAm L. REYNOLoS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 2002); EUGENE F.
SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICRJ. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(3d ed. 2000); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th
ed. 2001). But see LUTHER L. McDOuGAL, III, ROBERT L. FELIX & RALPH U. WHITTEN,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 63, at 255 (5th ed. 2001) ("However in an unusual line of
decisions, the United States Supreme Court has also indicated that federal law can
also sometimes preempt state procedural law."). Of course, some conflicts scholars,
perhaps prompted by their other curricular interests, bring their expertise on meth-
odology to bear profitably on reverse-Erie in occasional articles. See supra note 7. But
cf. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REv.
2448, 2493 (1999) (saying that conflicts scholars give preemption "little attention").
In fact, all law courses entail the Erie megadoctrine, but most do not focus on it.
Consider criminal law. Considerable federal procedural law applies in state criminal
cases, and some state law applies in federal criminal cases. Compare, e.g., Arizona v.
Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 250 (1981) (applying state appeal law in removed state
criminal case against federal officer), with, e.g., City of Aurora v. Erwin, 706 F.2d 295,
300 & n.10 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying incidents of federal jury procedure in a re-
moved criminal case). See generally Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in Government":
Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REv. 65 (2006) (discussing the
interrelation between state and federal criminal law). But because these occurrences
are either obvious or rare, and because state and federal subject matter jurisdictions
do not usually overlap in the sense of one sovereign's prosecuting crimes under the
other's laws, criminal law courses and scholars can afford to neglect Erie. They cannot
afford, however, to deny its relevance, as the court did in United States v. Powers, 482
F.2d 941,943 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Erie has no application whatsoever to federal criminal
prosecutions.").
215 Cf Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
768 (1994) ("Although as a topic, preemption has largely been ignored by constitu-
tional law scholars, it is almost certainly the most frequently used doctrine of constitu-
tional law in practice." (footnotes omitted)).
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who take a narrow view of reverse-Erie come at it from certain angles.
For federal courts scholars, the usual jumping-off point for approach-
ing reverse-Erie is Testa-Howlett.216 This narrow focus on congressional
control of court access would tend to produce a pinched view of re-
verse-Erie. For constitutional law scholars, the usual jumping-off point
is preemption. 217 They consequently tend to think primarily of the
relatively restrained preemption of state substantive law by congres-
sional statute, and their myopia works to obscure that reverse-Erie can
be more intrusive than Erie.
In sum, reverse-Erie is on the radar screen of relatively few schol-
ars. Of them, not enough use Erie as the departure point. Moreover,
virtually no law-school course combines study of reverse-Erie with pre-
emption. Thus, scholars and teachers tend not to observe, no less ex-
plain, why reverse-Erie is in a sense more intrusive than Erie. Nor do
they tend to perceive that reverse-Erie is the critical missing piece in
the big puzzle of the relationship between state and federal law. All
this appears to constitute the best, albeit unsatisfying, explanation of
its neglect.
CONCLUSION
The simple truth is that every question of law posed to every actor
in a system of federalism is preceded by the choice-of-law problem of
whether the legal question is a matter of state or federal law, a prob-
lem whose resolution is usually obvious but sometimes excruciatingly
difficult.
This ubiquitous truth prevails in state court. The sorely ne-
glected doctrine of reverse-Erie provides that federal law-be it consti-
tutional, statutory, or common law-will apply pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause in state court, subject to the Constitution or Con-
gress having already chosen the applicable law, whenever that federal
216 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Such views may influence certain
civil procedure books too. See, e.g., JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTAL, ARTHUR R.
MILLER &JOiN E. SEXTON, CMIL PROCEDURE 455-62 (8th ed. 2001) (using Testa as
well as Dice as teaching cases); cf FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 198 (omitting Testa
in that casebook's most recent edition).
217 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. For example, even though Professor
Chemerinsky provides an excellent discussion of preemption in his constitutional law
treatise, CHEMRRINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.2, he makes no mention of reverse-Elie
there. When he reaches the latter subject in his federal courts treatise, CHMERINSKY,
supra note 13, § 3.5, his constitutional law interest influences the narrow scope he
gives to reverse-Erie. Such views may influence certain civil procedure books too. See,
e.g., SILBERMAN & STEIN, supra note 156, at 111-12 (going from preemption approach
to narrow view of reverse-Erie).
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law preempts state law or, as less frequently acknowledged, prevails by
an Erie-like judicial balancing. If the state and federal laws directly
collide, then the federal law preempts; if not, then the state courts
must perform the federally mandated balancing of governmental in-
terests to determine the applicable law.
This understanding of reverse-Erie constitutes a heretofore miss-
ing but significant piece of the pervasive and puzzling problem of ver-
tical choice of law. Fitting it with all of the other pieces of the puzzle
helps to reveal the true relationship between state and federal law. It
interlocks with and ultimately merges into the overall Erie scheme to
form a logical pattern, in which not only the state and federal courts
but also all the other institutional and private actors can weigh state
and federal interests to shape or implement the optimal relationship
of state and federal law in our legal life.
